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MAKING SENSE OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY
Thomas H. Lee*
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed t6 ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America
INTRODUCTION
For some time, no one has argued that the Eleventh Amendment means
what it most plainly seems to say-that it prohibits federal jurisdiction as to
"any suit in law or equity" brought against a State "by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."' Since 1890, the fa-
tal critique of a literal reading of the Amendment has been that it makes no
sense ("anomalous... startling... unexpected") to read the Constitution as
debarring federal jurisdiction over suits against a State brought by citizens
of other States or foreigners, but, apparently, not citizens of that State.2 The
. Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D. candidate (Political Science),
Harvard. I thank William Alford, Richard Fallon, John Golden, Ben Gruenstein, Ann Lipton, Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Detlev Vagts, and Ben Zipursky for their kindness and insight. I owe special debts of
gratitude to Dean Feerick and to the late Abe Chayes, who always believed that the law of nations is part
of our laws. Errors and omissions are mine alone.
1 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727-30 (1999); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977) ("[TIhe eleventh
amendment is universally taken not to mean what it says."). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1047-58 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (summarizing the history
surrounding the passage of the Amendment and debates about its meaning); CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMuNrrY 3-40 (1972) (discussing pre-Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity history and doctrine).
2 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
It is true, the amendment does so read ... [but] then we should have this anomalous result, that in
cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the federal
courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of
other States, or of a foreign state .... If this is the necessary consequence of the language of the
Constitution and the law, the result is no less startling and unexpected than was the original deci-
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Supreme Court has more recently diverged from the Amendment's literal
language by extending the proscription on federal jurisdiction to suits
against the States in admiralty3 and such suits brought by foreign states
rather than just their citizens or "subjects," 4 even though the Eleventh
Amendment mentions only suits "in law or equity,' 5 and leaves untouched
Article III's grant of judicial power as to "controversies... between a State
... and foreign States."6
This Article introduces a new theory of the Eleventh Amendment's
meaning that explains its seemingly puzzling language as evincing the
Framers' purposive decision to incorporate into the Constitution, in recog-
nition of the sovereign equality of the States, the classical international law
rule that only states have rights against other states. The Amendment is es-
sentially just a negative formulation of the affirmative international rule,7
namely, a foreign citizen may not sue a sovereign state. To permit such a
suit would imply that a foreign citizen or a subject who is at most a frag-
ment of the sovereignty of his own state was the equal of a sovereign state
made up of many citizens, or, if a monarchy, its king and subjects. Read
through the interpretive lens of this international law theory, the forty-three
words of the Eleventh Amendment, carefully chosen and debated in every
state legislature over a five-year period, make sense. And the theory in turn
makes sense because the founding generation was not only familiar with
contemporary international law but also frequently consulted it in matters of
statecraft. It is unsurprising, then, that the Founders would turn to the set-
tled law of nations for guidance in deciding the domestic law issue of who
has standing to sue a State in interstate and international suits brought in
federal court. The Amendment says nothing about suits against States
brought by foreign states because such suits would be consistent with the
sovereign equality principle, presuming no difference between the sover-
eign dignity of a State and a nation-state, a powerful statement in itself
about the sovereign dignity of the American states. And because the
Amendment was intended, like the international law rule, to govern only in-
terstate or international disputes between private parties and States, it logi-
cally makes no statement about the rights of citizens to sue their own States
sion of this court, that under the language of the Constitution and of the judiciary act of 1789, a
State was liable to be sued by a citizen of another State, or of a foreign country.
Id. at 10.
3 Exparte New York, No. 1,256 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1921) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars
in personam admiralty jurisdiction in a suit brought by private parties against New York). But see Cali-
fornia v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 494-95 (1998) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
does not bar in rem admiralty suit against California where the State does not possess the res).
4 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1934).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
7 Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides an example of an affirmative
statement of the rule: "Only states may be parties in cases before the Court." STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Art. 34.
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in federal court.
The argument for a literal interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
has been made before on the theory that limiting the bar on suits against
States to suits brought by citizens of other States and foreigners was an at-
tempt to write the Amendment narrowly to deal with particular political
problems. Professors Lawrence Marshall and Calvin Massey have argued
separately that the Amendment is phrased as it is to deny access to federal
court to English and other out-of-state private creditors seeking to enforce
revolutionary war debts and property claims against the States.8 Marshall
claims that by curtailing these sorts of suits, the Amendment was more
broadly intended to preserve interstate and international peace; Massey
would ground a conditional sovereign immunity (similar to what is pro-
posed in this Article) on the Tenth Amendment instead.9
The problem with these explanations may be their reliance on short-
sighted pragmatism as principal motive-the theories are unappealing be-
cause it is unappealing to think that the Framers would amend the Constitu-
tion just to avoid the States' having to pay war debts to out-of-state private
parties. 10 As Professor Massey put it, "[a] rule that permits the states to vio-
late the federal rights of noncitizens and avoid direct accountability in fed-
eral court for those actions seems most peculiar, indeed, almost perverse""
and seems explicable only as an "unflinchingly political" decision 2 to shut
out British creditors and Loyalists seeking to reclaim their property. Far
more attractive is the notion that the Eleventh Amendment is a grand state-
ment about the sovereign dignity of States, 13 or a sober, prescient restriction
on open-ended diversity jurisdiction.14 Since the historical evidence seems
8 Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1342,
1356-71 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 61, 117 (1989).
9 Massey, supra note 8, at 143-45. The Tenth Amendment, enacted as part of the original Bill of
Rights in 1791, states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Others have also made this argument, but there is little to no evidence that the founding generation per-
ceived the Tenth Amendment in this way. As discussed infra, the Republican Government Clause may
have been drafted to perform the function that Professor Massey imputes to the Tenth Amendment.
10 One could argue that the theory might be supported by more admirable, less pragmatic motives,
e.g., cautiousness in the drafting of a constitutional amendment, a reluctance to involve the federal
courts in fractious disputes between a private noncitizen party and a State, but while its advocates have
made these points, see, e.g., Marshall, supra note 8, the centerpiece of their argument has been the out-
of-state situs of private creditors.
I Massey, supra note 8, at 67.
12 Id. (citing John 3. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter-
pretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2003 (1983)).
13 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,363 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
US. 62, 73 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
669-70 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,54 (1996).
14 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 101-02 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
1029
96:1027 (2002)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
inconclusive as among the existing theories, 15 it is not surprising that the
latter two theories ground the orthodox and leading heterodox interpreta-
tions of the Eleventh Amendment, despite the avowed preference for literal
language of leading members of both camps. 16
This Article is an attempt to breathe new life into the literal interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment by justifying it with a new, principled the-
ory. In so doing, it combines elements of both the orthodox ("federal-
question immunity") and heterodox ("diversity") theories. The interna-
tional law theory shares with the federal-question immunity interpretation
the notion that the Amendment was intended to protect the dignity of the
States' sovereignty (though how it defines the implicated dignity interest is
different), and, with the diversity theory, the idea that the Amendment ad-
dresses a problem unique to the interstate context-a problem that is posed
only when the plaintiff is a citizen of another State or a citizen or subject of
a foreign state. There are also important differences from each; the interna-
tional law theory most significantly departing from both in its faithfulness
to the literal language, because the threat to the sovereign dignity of the
States that the Amendment addressed in precise and unambiguous language
was posed uniquely by recognizing legal claims brought by citizens or sub-
jects of foreign or other American states and not the States themselves.
And, as important, the theory seems a better fit to all of the historical evi-
dence.
What makes the international law explanation a new theory notwith-
standing predecessor literal theories and the common themes shared with
the federal-question immunity and diversity theories is the premise that the
Amendment represents the application of international law principles to
solve the domestic problem of state sovereignty. The argument is not that
the drafters of the Amendment understood international law as substan-
tively binding with respect to the question of whether (and when) States
may be sued by private parties-this question was clearly understood as a
domestic problem to be controlled by the laws of the United States. Rather,
YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 (1987); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989) [hereinafter Fletcher, The Diversity Explana-
tion); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1071-72 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation]; Gibbons, supra
note 12, at 1891-94; Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988).
15 See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28 (1987) ("The search for the original understanding on state sovereign immu-
nity bears this resemblance to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to be found so that the faith-
fil of whatever persuasion can find their heart's desire.").
16 Compare, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 n.1 (2001) (Scalia, J.)
(using Webster's Dictionary to define "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes), with Akhil Reed
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 748, 748-49 (1999) (urging an approach to constitutional
interpretation that considers a term or phrase in the context of its other uses in the Constitution).
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it is that the Founders understood the States as sovereign entities bound to-
gether in an interdependent coexistence very much like the community of
nations, and they therefore frequently consulted international law and po-
litical theory to craft rules conducive to a peaceful and mutually respectful
coexistence. That insight, applied here to make sense of the careful words
of the Eleventh Amendment, may prove useful more generally to under-
stand other constitutional doctrines considered domestic in nature.
In terms of goals, then, this Article seeks first, to answer the historical
question of why the Eleventh Amendment reads as it does and in so doing
to present the case for interpreting the Amendment literally as a matter of
law. But that is not to say that the goal is to return the doctrine ahistorically
to that literal language; as Part IV will explain, the international law the-
ory's vision of what the doctrine should be lies somewhere between the
federal-question immunity and diversity theories, owing to important de-
velopments subsequent to the passage of the Amendment. There is, how-
ever, a second purpose, which concerns general techniques of constitutional
interpretation, applied here to a case study of the Eleventh Amendment.
Regardless whether one finds the explanation of the Amendment persuasive
or not, the background point is to show how the founding generation bor-
rowed from the law of nations to address issues of constitutional federalism
(certainly a far more useful compass in this respect than English common
law) in their statebuilding project. 17 The idea that important, "domestic"
aspects of American constitutional law have roots in international law has
been almost entirely neglected by judges, lawyers, and constitutional schol-
ars.
This Article has five parts. Part I introduces the international law the-
17 The historical American statebuilding project was not unlike the contemporary process by which
formerly autonomous nation-states have constructed an increasingly centralized political, economic, and
social system in Europe. More specifically, the process of building a suprastate judiciary presages the
rise of "supranational" courts such as the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights. See Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 280-84 (1997). As a general matter, the distinction between national
and international law was not as rigid in the late eighteenth century, particularly for thirteen ex-colonies
who were insecure about their status in the society of nations and thus predisposed to a robust law of
nations to reinforce their status as equal sovereigns, collectively or individually, vis-A-vis more powerful
and storied nations. On a domestic level, emphasizing the compulsory nature of the law of nations was
useful as an analogy to ensure obedience by the American states to the laws of the untested "general
government." Cf. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 819, 824-25 (1989) ("Notwithstanding the controversy that would erupt in the 1790s over the ex-
tent to which the common law formed the basis for the law of the national government, writers generally
asserted that the law of nations was part of the law of the new American states and their national gov-
enment.") It is not surprising, then, that the young republic was one of the most vociferous proponents
of the binding nature of international legal obligations, going so far as to include among Congress's
enumerated functions, the responsibility "[t]o define and punish ... Offenses against the Law of Na-
tions." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10; see also 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792) (Attorney General Ed-
mund Randolph) (declaring the law of nations to be binding on the United States although it was "not
specially adopted by the Constitution or any municipal act").
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ory and compares it to the other theories of the Eleventh Amendment. Part
II explains why it was logical for the founding generation to turn to interna-
tional law and norms for insights into domestic federalism issues and pre-
sents evidence tending to show that important figures in the origins of the
Eleventh Amendment were influenced by international law on the specific
issue of the States' sovereignty. Part III lays out the evidence for the vari-
ous theories and proposes that the international law theory is the most con-
sistent with all of the evidence. Part IV discusses the Fourteenth
Amendment's effects on the doctrinal prescriptions of the international law
theory and indicates the areas in which the theory, thus amended, suggests
that the current doctrine should be modified. Part V concludes by empha-
sizing again the complex perspective of the founding generation, specifi-
cally, their willingness to consult international law to solve difficult
questions of federalism, and counsels a similar open-mindedness today.
I. THEORIES OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A 5-4 majority of the current Supreme Court decisively rejected the di-
versity explanation of the Eleventh Amendment in the landmark decision of
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,18 in favor of the "federal-question immunity"
theory articulated in Hans v. Louisiana.19 The Seminole Tribe majority read
the Amendment as immunizing the States from all private suits in federal
court (whether brought by in-state citizens or out-of-state private parties),
regardless of the basis for subject matter jurisdiction most notably, even if
the private suit alleged a federal question. 20 The current doctrine also rec-
ognizes that this sovereign immunity, though constitutional in nature, may
be waived by the States or abrogated by Congress when it has properly and
explicitly authorized private causes of actions for money damages against
the States to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. This Part explains the in-
ternational law theory, as well as the federal-question immunity and diver-
sity theories, in greater detail.
A. The International Law Explanation
The classical law of nations imposed duties and conferred rights only
upon sovereign states.21 A sovereign state, in turn, was made up of citizens,
18 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
'9 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20 517 U.S. at 72-73.
21 See WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (5th English ed. 1916) ("[T]he subjects
of international law are, properly speaking, only States,-for they alone are vested with international
personality.") [hereinafter WHEATON]. The general rule still applies, but there has been growing recog-
nition ofprivate rights in international law, most notably, in the European Court of Justice and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, in which individuals can bring suits against any of the member European
states. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 277 ("Although both tribunals have the power to adju-
dicate state-to-state disputes-the province of traditional international adjudication-each has compiled
a more successful compliance record in cases involving private parties litigating directly against state
1032
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if a republic, or its king and his subjects, if a monarchy.22 The fact that the
drafters of Article I and the Eleventh Amendment felt the need to distin-
guish between "Citizens" and "Subjects" of foreign states indicates the ex-
tent to which the founding generation was similarly attuned to comparative
distinctions in forms of domestic political sovereignty. But each sovereign
state was the equal of any other in the society of states regardless of its form
of government, size, population, or power.23 The atomized individual was
therefore a nonentity with no rights or duties so far as the law of nations
was concerned, and to recognize the rights of a citizen or subject of one
state against a foreign state (even if that state were to consent to the private
rights) would imply that a fraction of the sovereignty of one state was equal
to the full sovereignty of another.24 This would belittle the sovereign dig-
nity of the latter state in the society of nations and pose a threat to the soci-
ety itself by impeaching the irreducible equality and dignity of the
sovereign state, its sole constituent unit. Emmerich de Vattel, the leading
writer on international law of the time, put it this way:
Every nation, every sovereign and independent state, deserves consideration
and respect, because it makes an immediate figure in the grand society of the
human race, is independent of all earthly power, and is an assemblage of a
great number of men who are, doubtless, more considerable than any individ-
ual. The sovereign represents his whole nation, he unites in his person all its
majesty. No individual, though ever so free and independent, can be placed in
competition with the sovereign; this would be to put a single person alone
upon an equality with an united multitude of his equals. Nations and sover-
eigns, are then, at the same time under an obligation, have a right to maintain
their dignity, and to cause it to be respected as of the utmost importance to
their safety and tranquility.25
It is one thing to say that the law of nations recognized only duties and
obligations between sovereign states as an extension of the sovereign equal-
ity principle; but as there were no international courts in the eighteenth cen-
tury, international law could provide no answer to the specific question
whether only a sovereign state could sue another state in a court invested
with the judicial power to decide interstate disputes. This is a different
question from whether a state might sue another sovereign state in its own
courts-it was settled under the law of nations that it could not.26 Certainly,
governments or against each other.").
22 WHEATON, supra note 21, at 34-35.
23 Id. at 261.
24 Of course, the one exception would be a monarch, in which "the person of the prince is necessar-
ily identified with the State itself: 'l'ttat c'est moi."' Id. at 34.
25 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS 208-09 (Northampton, Mass., Simeon
Butler, 4th Am. ed. 1820) (1758) (Book II, Ch. II, § 35).
26 See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145-46 (1812); James E. Pfander,
Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 582-
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standing to sue was reserved exclusively for states once formal international
courts were set up in the twentieth century. 7 But even earlier, the ad hoc
arbitral tribunals established by treaties to resolve reparations and boundary
disputes were limited to the claims of sovereign states against other sover-
eign states. And while much might have changed in the world and in the
law of nations in the two centuries between the drafting of the Eleventh
Amendment and the establishment of the first true international court, the
sovereign equality principle remained constant.
Considerations of sound policy in international relations provided fur-
ther justification for the sovereign equality principle and the resultant rule
of limiting standing in interstate disputes against sovereign States to other
States-parties. Because a sovereign state aggregated the preferences of
many citizens for the good of the state, the more extreme and trivial legal
claims of individuals aggrieved in their dealings with foreign states could
be filtered and mitigated through the domestic political process. Moreover,
sovereign states could resort to a range of political and diplomatic measures
besides lawsuits, and they could be counted upon to think strategically
about the merits of pursuing a claim versus countervailing costs to valuable
political and economic relationships that might be jeopardized. For in-
stance, pursuing a suit against another state concerning defaulted debt obli-
gations might invite similar claims in the future against the plaintiff state.
The end result would be that state-to-state lawsuits would be relatively rare
and confined to issues that were more national than individual in character.
A pertinent corollary to the sovereign equality principle was the long-
standing international law doctrine of espousal. Justice Iredell, author of
the dissent in the Supreme Court case that prompted enactment of the Elev-
enth Amendment and a great admirer of the law of nations, described the
doctrine in 1796, during the heart of the Amendment ratification debates as
follows:
When any individual, therefore, of any nation, has cause of complaint
against another nation, or any individual of it, not immediately amenable to au-
thority of his own, he may complain to that power in his own nation, which is
intrusted with the sovereignty of it, as to foreign negotiations, and he will be
entitled to all the redress which the nature of his case requires, and the situa-
tion of his own country will enable him to obtain.
Miserable and disgraceful indeed, would be the situation of the citizens of
the United States, if they were obliged to comply with a treaty on their part,
and had no means of redress for a non-compliance by the other contracting
power.
But they have, and the law of nations points out the remedy. The remedy
1034
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depends on the discretion and sense of duty of their own government. 28
We could as easily call this an exception rather than a corollary, but regard-
less of how convincing the fiction is, the doctrine posits that an individual's
claims, once espoused by his state, are national, not personal, in nature-it
is the espousing state asserting the right, and so the claim is recognized by
the law of nations.29
An important question arises as to the scope of the rights of citizens
and subjects within each sovereign state. As a formal matter, this was a
question for domestic law and political theory3" but, as a practical matter,
Enlightenment thinkers considered it deeply relevant to international law
for three reasons. First, given the lack of a centralized enforcement author-
ity in the international system, the classical law of nations was justified by
its advocates as the embodiment of the law of nature.31 As Vattel put it,
"the law of nations is originally no more than the law of nature applied to
nations. '32 The rights of individuals in domestic society were also defended
at that time by reference to the law of nature, and being natural law enthusi-
asts, international law philosophers were favorably disposed to domestic
forms of government that protected individual rights.
Second, and in a related vein, because individuals had no rights (or,
more accurately, did not exist) as between sovereign states in the law of na-
tions, the normative appeal of an international society for anyone who cared
about individual rights at all was enhanced by the proliferation of states in
which such rights were recognized domestically. In other words, the non-
status of the individual citizen or subject in the international sphere made it
that much more imperative to advance his recognition within the sovereign
state. Otherwise, the law of nations might be used to perpetuate a system of
repressive sovereign states in which, ironically, princes would aggrandize
28 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 259-60 (1796) (redell, J., concurring).
29 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12.
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when
injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have
been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of
its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his be-
half, a State is in reality asserting its own rights - its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.
Id.
30 See VATrEL, supra note 25, at 65-66 (Bk. I, Ch. 1II, § 29) ("It is not our business particularly to
consider, what ought to be this constitution, and these laws; this discussion belongs to public laws and
politics.!).
31 See SAMUEL PuFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCro [Eight Books on the Law
of Nature and of Peoples] (1688 ed.), Bk. I, Ch. 11, §§ 1-2. But see Richard Tuck, Natural Rights and
Empire (manuscript on file with author) (concluding that Thomas Hobbes formulated the idea of the
lawless "state of nature" upon which he grounded his proto-liberal domestic political theory from the
same interaction of sovereign nations that led Hugo Grotius and Pufendorf to theorize about the harmo-
nious law of nations).
32 VATrEL, supra note 25, at 48 (Preliminaries § 6).
1035
96:1027 (2002)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
personal power at the expense of the common welfare that justified the
creation of states in the first place.
Third, and most importantly, to the extent that representative govern-
ments were believed to be less likely to go to war than despotic regimes
where subjects had no choice but to do the state's (that is, the prince's) will,
an international society of representative sovereign states was more likely to
be cooperative and free of conflict.33 As Immanuel Kant reasoned, in a rep-
resentative state, the decision to go to war would be made by the citizens
who would be doing the fighting and dying rather than by the prince, who
could decide to go to war without risk to his own life; this would logically
lead to fewer, more carefully considered decisions to go to war.34
Thus, international law scholars of the late eighteenth century surmised
that the effectiveness of the law of nations depended to a considerable de-
gree on the proliferation of sovereign states that recognized individual
rights-states, loosely speaking, that possessed the "republican form of
government." 35 Just what constitutes the republican form of government is
a difficult question of political theory; it suffices for our purposes to say
that sovereignty in a republic reposes in equal and free citizens, and that the
state is always subject to the republic's fundamental laws, which corre-
spond to the terms of the citizenry's original consent to be governed. In a
monarchy, by contrast, the prince is the state and thus the state is, by defini-
33 See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY AND
MORALS 113 (Ted Humphrey trans., Hackett Publ'n Co. 1983) (1795) [hereinafter KANT, PERPETUAL
PEACE].
[T]he republican constitution also provides for this desirable result, namely, perpetual peace, and
the reason for this is as follows: If (as must inevitably be the case, given this form of constitution)
the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is
natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.
(Among these are doing the fighting themselves, paying the costs of war from their own resources,
having to repair at great sacrifice the war's devastation, and, finally, the ultimate evil that would
make peace itself better, never being able-because of new and constant wars-to expunge the
burden of debt.).
Id. (emphasis added). Kant, writing in 1795 between the drafting and the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment-a contemporary of the same Western intellectual culture if not personally known to the
founders-has postulated an inverse relationship between sovereign debt and republican govemment It
seems not altogether unlikely that the Founders might have reasoned similarly-that they believed that
representative republican governments in the States would decrease not only interstate friction generally,
but also, specifically, ballooning sovereign debts and subsequent defaults that were the overwhelming
source of private lawsuits against the states by both citizens and foreigners. For a modem version of the
Kantian "democratic peace" theory, see BRUCE RuSSETr, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE:
PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993). For an exposition of "liberal" international rela-
tions theory that systematizes the Kantian insight concerning the causal significance of domestic regime
types in determining outcomes in the international system, see Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences
Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 530-33 (1997).
34 See KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE supra note 33, at 112-15.
35 See id.; see also VATrEL, supra note 25, at 63 (Bk. I, Ch. II, § 24) ("An admirable constitution [in
England] places every citizen in a situation that enables him to contribute to [national flourishing.] ...
Happy constitution! which they did not suddenly obtain; it has cost rivers of blood; hut they have not
purchased it too dear.").
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tion, immune to the claims of right or law of subjects, 36 but for moral claims
on sovereign grace.
This normative projection of republican values into domestic politics
constituted an important eighteenth-century gloss on the traditional law-of-
nations principle of sovereignty as set forth by Hugo Grotius. The tradi-
tional Grotian principle assumed the equality of sovereign states in interna-
tional society regardless of the form of internal government, and, by virtue
of the fact that only states are vested with international "personality," made
no statement about the rights of private individuals against the states. 37
But Enlightenment political theory was indeterminate as to the specific
question whether the republican form of government endorsed the right of
citizens to sue the sovereign state to compensate for transgressions of indi-
vidual rights. Certainly, at the most general level, the possibility that the
sovereign, even in a republic, might break the terms of its social contract
with its citizens was contemplated, and divergent opinions formed on the
legitimacy of various forms of citizen action in response--most spectacu-
larly, revolution.38 Even Kant, who for the most part seems to have be-
lieved that the citizens in a republic were stuck with the terms of the social
contract they had struck, seems to have been aware of, and concerned
about, the potential for the sovereign to interfere with fundamental individ-
ual rights through, for example, its powers of taxation and eminent do-
main.39 Vattel gave voice to such concerns: "In all well-regulated states, in
countries that are really states, and not the dominions of a despotic prince,
the ordinary tribunals decide the causes in which the sovereign is con-
cerned, with as much freedom as those between private persons."40
Vattel took pains to warn that the sovereign was not entitled to any
special immunity or treatment in the courts, especially with respect to mat-
36 See KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE supra note 33, at 112.
The sole established constitution that follows from the idea of an original contract, the one on
which all of a nation's just legislation must be based, is republican. For, first, it accords with the
principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as men), second, it accords with the princi-
ples of the dependence of everyone on a single, common [source of] legislation (as subjects), and
third, it accords with the law of the equality ofthem all (as citizens).
Id.
37 See Hugo Grotius, DE JURE BELLI, Ac PAciS Lmi TRES [Three Books on the Law of War and of
Peace] (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Clarendon Press 1929) (1623-24), Bk. 1 ch. 3 § 8 cl. 2.
Just as, in fact, there are many ways of living, one being better than another, and out of so many
ways of living each is free to select that which he prefers, so also a people can select the form of
government which it wishes; and the extent of its legal right in the matter is not to be measured by
the superior excellence of this or that form of government, in regard to which different men hold
different views, but by its free choice.
Id.
38 See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 254 (R. Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651);
KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE, supra note 33.
39 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE §§ 2-4 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-
Merrill Educ. Publ'n 1965) (1797).
40 VATIML, supra note 25, at 136 (138 in 1805 edition) (Bk. I, Ch. XIII, § 164) (emphasis added).
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ters concerning revenue, and that, consequently, the sovereign's role should
be limited to maintaining and executing the judgments of domestic courts.41
At the same time, he qualified that the sovereign should only be held ac-
countable for violations of fundamental laws, and not of political laws, in
order to ensure an administrable government.42  He is not exactly clear
about what laws were "fundamental"--we need not, for one, presume that
they must be congruent with a written constitution. At the very least, they
included laws relating to the state's structure and operation, for example,
the prohibition of monarchy, equal rights of citizens to vote, or separation
of powers-violations of which by definition undermine the republican
form of government. These violations, to be sure, could be remedied with-
out private causes of action for money damages; but there are violations of
individual rights that Enlightenment liberals would consider "fundamental"
which would seem to require such a remedy-for instance, taxation without
representation or the taking of private property without just compensation.
The most that can be said, then, about the suability of a sovereign state by
its own citizens in its own courts from an international law perspective is
that it was hoped such suits would be permitted, but it was perceived as a
matter to be decided by the state pursuant to its form of government, and
that the republican form of government was consistent with sovereign su-
ability for fundamental violations.
This is different from the question (hypothetical until the twentieth
century) whether a sovereign state might be sued by its own citizens for a
violation of the law of nations in an international court. For one, the sover-
eign equality principle would not be a per se bar to this suit because an in-
dividual (at least, a citizen in a republic) does have a claim on the
sovereignty of his own state, if not on the sovereignty of another. There is
another difficulty, however. Under the traditional law of nations, the claim
of a citizen against his own state was necessarily one of domestic, not inter-
national, law and hence could not even present the issue of standing before
a general court.4 3 But under modem international law, individuals do have
rights against their own states for especially heinous acts (genocide and tor-
ture come to mind) that offend humanity.44 If an individual might state a
claim under international law against his state, then, the question whether
41 See id. at 137 (139 in 1805 edition) (§ 167); see also id. at 136 (138 in 1805 ed.) (§ 164).
The establishment of courts ofjustice is particularly necessary, to decide the causes relating to the
revenue; that is, all the disputes that may arise between those who are employed in behalf of the
prince and the subjects. It would be very unbecoming, and highly improper for a prince, to resolve
to be judge in his own cause; he cannot be too much on his guard against the illusions of interest
and self love ....
Id.
42 See id. at 65 (§ 29).
43 Cf Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 17, at 277.
44 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concur-
ring); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702 (1982).
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an international court should decide that claim would necessarily turn on
the extent to which the state is understood to have ceded its internal sover-
eignty-its exclusive power to govern within its borders-to the interna-
tional court.
A hypothetical may help to demonstrate how these international law
principles explain the words of the Eleventh Amendment. Imagine that a
baker's dozen of young, weak sovereign states unite to fight a common foe
and to preserve peace as between each other. In so doing, a balance is
struck between powers the states must necessarily give up to act as one na-
tion vis-h-vis nonunited states ("external sovereignty") and the powers and
status the united states retain within their territories and vis-i-vis the other
united states ("internal sovereignty"). They therefore cede important pow-
ers to newly established general government institutions, including a court
with the judicial power to decide, among other things, disputes between the
united sovereign states and between those united states and nonunited sov-
ereign states.
Imagine, then, that the court construes the judicial power to extend to a
suit brought by a citizen of one of the united states against another of the
states. Such a suit among the united states clearly does not implicate exter-
nal sovereignty vis-i-vis foreign states; nor would a suit brought by a for-
eign citizen or subject who has no rights under the law of nations. But in
light of the traditional international law rule that only sovereign states have
rights against sovereign states, would not allowing the general judicial
power to be used in this way denigrate the sovereignty of the state being
sued? The Eleventh Amendment seems carefully phrased to answer pre-
cisely this question: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
of Subjects of any Foreign State." The answer logically says nothing about
the case that is not presented, that of suits filed by "Citizens of the State."
While the Amendment faithfully adopts the traditional international
law rule to decide the interstate case, the specific issue at the heart of the in-
terpretive question is complicated by a variation. To illustrate, return to the
hypothetical and assume that one hundred years after the first suit, there is a
second suit, this time brought by a citizen of one of the united states against
his own state in the general court, and that the suit alleges a claim under the
joint laws of the united states (that is, a federal question, nondiverse suit
like Hans v. Louisiana). Twenty-five years before the second suit, the un-
ion experienced a failed attempt at secession by a number of states that re-
sulted in a strengthening of the union at the expense of the internal
sovereignty of the individual united states.
In deciding whether the court ought to be able to hear this case, the
rulemaker is confronted with a choice grounded in how he chooses to char-
acterize the laws of the united states. In light of the challenge to and ulti-
mate reaffirmation of the union, one might say that the laws of the united
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states have thereby assumed the cast of unitary national laws, directly bind-
ing on all citizens of the united states, without distinction as to their state
citizenship. From this perspecitve, a violation of these laws by one of the
states would be actionable in the courts of the united states by a citizen of
that state as it would be by a citizen of any of the united states. A rule that
would afford such jurisdiction privileges the general government to make
laws that trump state power even where the only parties to the dispute are
one of the united states and one of its citizens, necessarily diminishing the
exclusive sphere of that state's internal sovereignty.
Or, one might downplay the effect of the threat and survival of the un-
ion, and argue that, notwithstanding the fact that the laws of the united
states have been violated, the general court still lacks the power to decide
cases where those general laws overlap with the internal sovereignty of the
states, which, in this important respect, has been left intact in the course of
events. Viewed in this light, it is plain to see that the issue no longer turns
on the sovereign equality principle used to decide the first case involving a
suit against a state by a noncitizen of the state, but rather on the constancy
of the states' internal sovereignty.
The second conclusion would not have been one reached by the origi-
nal rulemakers if they were receptive to the Enlightenment international law
perspective, putting aside for the moment the fact that the first case (a suit
against a state by a noncitizen) did not present this more difficult issue. As
already discussed, the notion of absolute sovereign immunity, even for vio-
lations of fundamental laws, was at some level inconsistent with the politi-
cal theory of republican government, and while this was an issue primarily
for domestic courts, it would still have been problematic to make such a
statement as to state sovereign immunity in the general court. Also, to add
the additional proscription against suits by own-state citizens, even if it
were correct as a matter of the law of nations at the time (which recognized
no legal claims by a citizen against his own state), would convert the origi-
nal rule from a statement about the dignity and equality of sovereign states
as aggregations of peoples to a statist assertion on the power of the state as
against mortals within its borders.
This, in a nutshell, is the international law theory of the Eleventh
Amendment-the crucial insight being the notion that its drafters perceived
the States, in some respects (here, immunity from the claims of citizens or
subjects of other States or foreign states), as equivalent to sovereign states
in the society of nations. This is a very different concept of the States' dig-
nity interest that is implicated in private suits in federal court than that ar-
ticulated by advocates of the federal-question immunity theory. To claim
that the Amendment stands for the proposition that the States are endowed
with a constitutional immunity from suit by any private parties unduly con-
fuses the sovereign equality principle that undergirded the Eleventh
Amendment's enactment (a response to a Supreme Court decision permit-
ting a suit against a State by a citizen of another State) with a respect for
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exclusive state power vis-h-vis citizens in its sphere of internal sover-
eignty-a concept that was both diminished and discredited by the Civil
War. As we will discuss later, it is this nineteenth-century historical event,
not anything to do with the original meaning of the Eleventh Amendment,
that leads to the conclusion shared in part by the diversity theory that all
citizens of the United States (but not citizens or subjects of foreign states)
should be understood to have a right to sue the States in federal court for
constitutional and certain other federal statutory violations. The next sub-
part turns, then, to the existing explanations of the Amendment.
B. The Federal-Question Immunity Explanation
There is already a very thorough literature explaining, defending, and
attacking the federal-question immunity and diversity theories of the Elev-
enth Amendment.45 This subpart therefore sketches only briefly the rele-
vant background, leaving interested readers to consult the literature as
desired. To understand the two theories, it is necessary to start with Article
I, the construction of which the Eleventh Amendment purported to nar-
row. Article I relevantly provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-
to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens
of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States; and be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects.45
The Eleventh Amendment's clarification was enacted to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, which quite reasonably4 7
read Article I and the relevant statute (section 13 of the Judiciary Act) to
support its original jurisdiction over the case.48 Alexander Chisholm, a
South Carolina citizen, had sued the State of Georgia to compel it to make
payments due to him as executor to the estate of a South Carolina merchant
who had contracted to provide supplies to Georgia during the Revolution.4 9
45 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 13, 14.
46 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
47 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I am of opinion that the
decision in [Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793),] was based upon a sound interpretation of
the Constitution as that instrument then was."); see also Gibbons, supra note 12, at 1895 ("Certainly
from a textual standpoint, the suggestion that states were immune from suit in federal court seems pre-
posterous on its face in light of the express provision in article HI ... ").
" "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdic-
tion." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
49 See Chisholn v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
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Affirming its jurisdiction, the Court, by a four to one vote,50 ordered a de-
fault judgment entered against Georgia if it continued to fail to appear in
federal court without showing cause. Apparently taking its cue from Justice
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, Congress soon thereafter drafted the Eleventh
Amendment to abrogate the result in Chisholm, and President Adams veri-
fied its ratification by a requisite twelve States in 1798 (New Jersey and
Pennsylvania refused to ratify; Tennessee and South Carolina apparently
took no action).5
The next important case in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and
the seminal case supporting the federal-question immunity theory, was de-
cided a century later in 1890. In Hans v. Louisiana, a Louisiana citizen
brought suit in federal court alleging that Louisiana violated the Contracts
Clause52 by refusing to pay interest on bonds it had issued.53
The facts in Hans were thus similar to those in Chisholm with two key
differences: First, Hans was a Louisiana citizen suing his home state
whereas Chisholm involved a citizen of South Carolina suing the State of
Georgia. Second, although the subject matter of the claim was similar (the
Contracts Clause does not distinguish between public securities and simple
contracts), the plaintiff in Hans expressly appealed to the constitutional and
statutory federal-question jurisdiction of the federal court, whereas Chis-
holm, in the absence of a general federal-question jurisdiction statute at the
time,54 claimed statutory jurisdiction under section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which accorded the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over "all
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a
state and its citizens"55 without distinction as between federal question and
50 Chief Justice Jay and Justices Blair, Cushing, and Wilson agreed in separate opinions that juris-
diction was proper. See id. at 449-53 (Blair, J.); 453-66 (Wilson, J.); 466-69 (Cushing, J.); 469-79
(Jay, C.J.). Justice Iredell was the lone dissenter. See id. at 429-49. The opinions of Justice Iredell and
Wilson are most pertinent to this Article and are discussed in great detail. See infra subpart IH.D.
51 See CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 101 & n.2 (rev. ed.
1987) (noting "the informal and careless manner in which ratification was promulgated"); Eleventh
Amendment, in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, at 597-604 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DOcumENTARY HISTORY].
52 "No State shall ... pass any.., law impairing the obligation of contracts .... U.S. CONST. art.
I,§ 10, cl. 1.
53 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 1-4, 9 (1890).
54 The first general federal-question jurisdiction statute, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92,
was passed by a lame-duck Federalist Congress in 1801, but repealed a year later, Act of Mar. 8, 1802, 2
Stat. 132; see also HART& WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 879.
55 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80-81. The corresponding constitutional basis in Article
IH provides for jurisdiction over "all Cases... in which a State shall be a Party." U.S. CONST. art. m,
§ 2, cl. 2. An argument could be made based on this constitutional provision that there was no need for
a statutory basis for the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in Chisholm at all, since, unlike the lower
federal courts, Congress has no power not to create a Supreme Court at all or to diminish the constitu-
tional scope of its jurisdiction. See Ins. Corp. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 701-02
(1982).
Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a
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State-private party diversity suits. It was therefore unnecessary to reach in
Chisholm the question whether the case was one arising under the Constitu-
tion. But if Chisholm could be seen as an "arising under" case (in the Su-
preme Court's original jurisdiction), as the Hans Court appears to have
assumed a hundred years later and Justice Wilson implied in his opinion,56
then the Eleventh Amendment would not have overruled Chisholm at all on
the diversity theory that it was enacted just to proscribe suits against the
States brought by private parties under the diversity jurisdiction in cases
that could be pleaded under either diversity or federal-question jurisdiction
like Chisholm itself.
The Hans Court, with the knowledge that the Eleventh Amendment
had been passed to overturn the result in Chisholm, reasonably would not
have thought to look to the diversity theory for its meaning because the
Eleventh Amendment would then have no effect at all on claims indistin-
guishable from Chisholm's claim but arising under the Contracts Clause.
This was an important consideration in a time reminiscent of the political
and historical context in Chisholm, as the southern States confronted daunt-
ing war debts in the wake of another rebellion, though of different cause
and result.5 7
The Hans Court therefore focused on, and ultimately dismissed as un-
tenable, the other distinction-the citizenship of the plaintiff. As the Court
admitted, the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment suggested that this
was a difference of constitutional moment:
In the present case the plaintiff in error contends that he, being a citizen of
Louisiana, is not embarrassed by the obstacle of the Eleventh Amendment, in-
asmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits against a State which are
brought by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
state. It is true, the Amendment does so read .... 58
statutory grant of jurisdiction. ... T]his reflects the constitutional source of federal judicial
power Apart from this Court, that power only exists "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish."
Id. (quoting U.S. CONsT. art Ill, § 1).
56 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,464 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
[W]hen we view this [constitutional] object [to establish justice], in conjunction with the declara-
tion, "that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts;" we shall probably think,
that this object points, in a particular manner, to the jurisdiction of the court over the several states.
What good purpose could this constitutional provision secure, if a state might pass a law impairing
the obligation of its own contracts; and be amenable, for such a violation of right. to no controlling
judiciary power?
Id. Alexander Hamilton, in March of 1796, similarly believed that Georgia's revocation of a land-grant
contract in a separate case offended the Contracts Clause rendering it amenable to suit in federal court
under the federal-question jurisdiction. See Moultrie v. Georgia, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 51, at 512. See generally BENIAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 1-26 (1938).
57 WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 94.
58 Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
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But the Court felt that this, too, was a problematic distinction insofar as
it produced the "anomalous result"
that in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, a State
may be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued
for a like cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state;
and may be thus sued in the federal courts, although not allowing itself to be
sued in its own courts.59
The Hans Court thus took the fateful step of ignoring this distinction and
extending the Eleventh Amendment to claims arising under the Constitution
of the United States brought by a State's own citizens.60
Also divorced from the language of the Amendment are two excep-
tions to the States' sovereign immunity from private suits set forth by the
existing doctrine-one was mentioned in Hans, the other has been refined
in a recent line of Supreme Court decisions. First, the Hans Court assumed
without explanation that a State could be sued with its consent.61 But, at
least in international law, the consent of one sovereign state to private rights
(like the right to sue the state in its courts) against it does not suffice to cre-
ate such private rights, because consent would affect not only the consent-
ing state's sovereignty over which it had discretion, but the vitality of the
sovereign equality principle in general. And with the erosion of that bed-
rock, the law of nations, indeed, the society of nations, might collapse into
anarchy. To the extent that the sovereign' equality of the States might be
similarly viewed as important to interstate peace, unilateral consent would
seem equally problematic in the Eleventh Amendment context.
Second, under current doctrine, Congress may abrogate the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it explicitly and properly legislates
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 This seems inconsistent
with the text: the Amendment simply says that the "Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed," without saying that the courts may
not so construe it but Congress by statute (or the States by consent) may. In
terms of the sovereign equality principle, it should not matter who is defac-
ing a State's sovereign dignity if it exists as a matter of constitutional law-
the State itself or the suprastate judiciary or legislature, for in any case, the
implicit superiority of the State vis-A-vis noncitizens who do not participate
in its sovereignty would be undermined. Indeed, it makes better sense to
construe the constitutional limitation as intended by the States that ratified
the Amendment between 1793 and 1798 to constrain, in addition to the
courts, the notoriously partisan Federalist Congress that was in power until
59 Id.
60 See id. at 14-17.
61 Id. at 17.62 See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 US.
62, 80 (2000); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
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1802. For example, under the abrogation theory, Congress could have by-
passed the Amendment by passing legislation requiring performance on
state securities or contracts that pass in interstate commerce and providing
for enforcement by private suits for money damages against States in fed-
eral court.
Admittedly, the current doctrine eliminates the possibility of such ab-
rogation by foreclosing Congress's power to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity under Article 163 and limiting that power solely to legislation en-
forcing the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment (1868), which
"fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the
Constitution."64 This supplies a neat post hoc reason for why abrogation of
state sovereign immunity in federal courts by Congress may not have been
an issue at all between 1798 and 1868,65 but it introduces a new tension.
That is to say, if the State-federal balance was radically reset in 1868, why
is it necessary that Congress may only abrogate pursuant to its powers un-
der Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment? If a new balance controls,
why, as a matter of logic, should not Congress be understood to have
greater powers vis-h-vis the States, including the power to render them
amenable to suit for money damages to enforce its laws, whenever Con-
gress's power would be "incomplete without the authority to render States
liable in damages"? 66 These are hard questions, but it seems fair to say that
the limited doctrine of abrogation, despite its departure from the literal lan-
guage of the Eleventh Amendment, stands on firmer ground than other as-
pects of the current law of state sovereign immunity.
C. The Diversity Explanation
When compared to the federal-question immunity theory, the diversity
theory makes a better attempt to stay faithful to the text of the Eleventh
Amendment as superimposed on Article Ill. It reads the Amendment as ad-
dressing only the language of Article III that extends federal jurisdiction "to
Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State," and also,
presumably (the issue has not been presented in a case), "between a State
... and foreign... Citizens or Subjects." 67 Specifically, diversity advo-
63 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
64 See id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
65 Additionally, the issue of sovereign immunity of States in cases arising under federal law that
Congress might even seek to abrogate likely did not come up that often given that another general fed-
eral question jurisdictional statute was not enacted until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470. But
federal question suits brought by private parties against States may have been possible in theory under
statutes of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (authorizing suit in federal
district court to revoke an invalid patent); Act of Feb. 15, 1819, 3 Stat. 481 (authorizing suit in district
court for patent infringement).
66 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 59-73.
67 See Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 14, at 1265.
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cates contend that the Amendment limits the construction of these provi-
sions to authorize jurisdiction only in controversies in which the State was
plaintiff, regardless of the broader implications of the original phrasing.
The important corollary is that the Amendment does not apply at all to the
other jurisdictional headings, most notably, the "arising under" clause, and
so the Amendment says nothing about whether private citizens may or may
not bring federal question suits against the States.
Differently stated, the crucial difference as to textual interpretation be-
tween the diversity theory and the international law theory concerns the
proper way to understand the words "any suit in law or equity." The diver-
sity theory reads the phrase narrowly to mean "any suit" brought under the
two diversity jurisdictional heads ("State-Citizen" and "State-Foreign"),
whereas the international law theory reads it more broadly to mean "any
suit in law or equity" brought by a citizen of another State or foreign citi-
zens or subjects against one of the States in any applicable heading of Arti-
cle 111.68 That difference, though, would add only one more (albeit
important) Article III jurisdictional peg--"all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority." This is because by
Article III's literal language, the Eleventh Amendment would not apply to
cases affecting ambassadors (who represent, and are therefore not "Citizens
or Subjects of, any foreign States") or of admiralty (not "law or equity"); or
to "controversies" involving the United States as party, between the States,
citizens of different States, or citizens of the same State.
There is one more point. The original State-Foreign diversity heading
of Article III extended judicial power to "controversies ... between a State
... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." The Eleventh Amendment
only addressed suits against States brought by "Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The reasonable conclusion-
consistent with the sovereign equality principle-would be that suits against
States brought by "foreign States" were still to be permitted; indeed, to al-
low them would be to accord a greater dignity to the State by virtue of the
implied equality of station to a nation-state in the community of nations.
The Supreme Court decision in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,69
68 Article III, Section 2, clause 1 reads as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Au-
thority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another
State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1.
69 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
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however, extended the Eleventh Amendment bar to such suits. 70 It is not
clear whether diversity theorists take issue with this extension, but if they
do not, it would be another jurisdictional peg that the international law the-
ory creates vis-h-vis the diversity theory.
There are two important discrepancies that make it difficult to square
the diversity theory with the text and history of the Eleventh Amendment.
With regard to language, it seems that if the Amendment were meant to be
restricted to the two diversity headings in Article Im, it would say that the
judicial power should not be construed to extend to "controversies" (the
only word commonly used to mark the subject matter of those two diversity
headings) rather than to "any suit in law or equity." Under the international
law theory, the careful choice of the words "any suit in law or equity" is
sensibly explained as an integrated reference to the Article III words
"Cases, in Law and Equity," describing federal jurisdiction arising under
federal law and under the two sorts of diversity "Controversies. '71
With respect to history, there is a bigger problem-claims held by for-
eign citizens and subjects and out-of-state U.S. citizens were viewed as rais-
ing at least potential federal questions around the time that Chisholm was
decided and the Eleventh Amendment was enacted.72 Certainly, claims by
British creditors under the Paris Treaty of 1783 arose under federal law, and
Justice Wilson, for one, perceived the contract claim in Chisholm as impli-
cating the Contracts Clause. The drafters of the Eleventh Amendment were
certainly aware that the federal judicial power might be construed to extend
to contract claims against the States on the independent ground that they
arose under "the Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties."
It seems implausible, then, as we have said, that they would draft the
Amendment to restrict only diversity claims, since the effect of such a con-
stitutional amendment could be easily overcome by the passage of a general
federal-question jurisdiction statute, such as was in fact enacted by the
lame-duck Federalist Congress in 1801, a mere three years after the
Amendment's ratification.
That being said, the international law theorists would agree with the
diversity theorists that Hans v. Louisiana was wrongly decided, but not in-
sofar as it interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to reach federal-question ju-
risdiction. Rather, the international law theory proposes that the Amend-
ment, as its literal language suggests, does bar "any suit in law or equity,"
including federal-question suits, when the plaintiff is a citizen of another
State or citizen or subject of a foreign state. The Amendment does not say
anything about the case of a federal-question suit against a State brought by
a citizen of the State-a scenario that was not presented by the facts in
70 Id. at331-32.
71 Cf Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821) (deciding that writ of error from
state-court decision was not a "suit").
72 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Chisholm.
But, if Chisholm were a citizen of Georgia, what would the drafters of
the Eleventh Amendment have said, presuming that they were thinking of
the problem by analogy to contemporary international law and sovereign
nation-states? On one level, the answer seems easy, because even if the
Framers were receptive to the Enlightenment international law norm that
sovereign states should be subject to the legal claims of their citizens, that
norm contemplated suability for important, fundamental violations of law.
It is doubtful whether a common-law assumpsit cause of action for the
breach of a contract entered into by a State at war as in Chisholm would
have been considered a fundamental violation even if, as Justice Wilson as-
sumed at the time and the Hans Court assumed a hundred years later, such a
violation did state a constitutional claim under the Contracts Clause as then
understood. This would require, however, a new distinction between fun-
damental violations for which States are suable and federal statutory and
constitutional claims of a nonfundamental nature from which the States
would be immune. While distinguishing between actionable fundamental
constitutional violations and less fundamental ones for which immunity ap-
plies may seem sensible in theory, it would seem difficult to do in practice,
nor does American constitutional law present any basis for such a distinc-
tion.
Presuming, then, that fundamental violations are congruent with con-
stitutional ones, and assuming as well, in line with the modem position, that
such violations by a nation-state against its citizens state a claim arising un-
der the law of nations (as we must by way of analogy since the Hans Court
assumed that Hans presented a claim arising under the laws of the United
States), the only obstacle from the intemational law perspective to an exer-
cise of jurisdiction on these facts would be the affront it would occasion to
the internal sovereignty of the nation-state. As applied to the American
case in 1798, this would have been a very difficult question-the States had
ceded a measure of their sovereignty to the federal government and had
promised that the laws of the United States would be the supreme law of the
land,73 but this was premised on a theory of mutually exclusive spheres of
sovereignty that did not cleanly address the paradoxical possibility that
valid laws of the United States might displace a State's power vis-a-vis its
citizens. We do have, however, the Republican Government Guarantee
Clause74 (or, as Professor Massey advocates, the Tenth Amendment), 75
which might be read to exercise such a braking force.76 The best that we
73 U.S. CONST. art. Vl, cl. 2.
74 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
75 Massey, supra note 8, at 143-45.
76 Cf Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419, 448 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) ("The people of
the State created, the people of the State can only change, its Constitution. Upon this power there is no
other limitation but that imposed by the Constitution of the United States; that it must be of the Republi-
can form." (emphasis added)).
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can say, then, is that there is no clear answer to this question.
But in 1890, for the same reason of federal-state rebalancing articu-
lated in Fitzpati'ck v. Bitzer grounding the logic of congressional abroga-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment,77 it seems more reasonable to
conclude that internal sovereignty ought not bar suits against a State by its
citizens alleging violations of, at least, the Constitution of the United States.
And, as Part IV will explain, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment may be read to say that all United States citizens
should enjoy this right to sue for constitutional violations to the same extent
enjoyed by citizens of the State.71
HI. INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERSTATE POLITICS
So far, this Article has introduced a theory of the Eleventh Amend-
ment's meaning; one that fits the Amendment's language better than exist-
ing theories, but a theory, nonetheless, the validity of which depends on the
existence vel non of supporting evidence. Part III will discuss the pertinent
evidence and compare the fit of this theory with that of the other theories; it
seems useful, first, to explain in general terms why the theory is a plausible
one. By this I mean why it makes sense to argue that the founding genera-
tion (most importantly, those associated with the Eleventh Amendment)
perceived the States as sovereign nation-states in some respects and accord-
ingly drafted constitutional text to incorporate certain useful international
law rules.
The argument here is not that the founding generation thought of the
law of nations as an independent substantive body of law (like the Constitu-
tion, laws passed by Congress, and the laws of the several States) that sup-
plies binding rules of decision in the domestic context. There is a rich,
separate literature concerning the degree to which the Founders felt them-
selves obligated by international law79 and whether these obligations were
thought to have operated through federal or state law.80 This Article fo-
77 427 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1976).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. xiv, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
79 See, e.g., Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Be-
tween Foreign Policy andInternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1084-95 (1985).
so Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 821 (1997) (contending that
the idea that customary international law is federal common law is of recent vintage and inconsistent
with separation of powers, federalism, and American democracy), with Harold Hongju Koh, Is Interna-
tional Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1827 (1998) (supporting the traditional position
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cuses, rather, on the unexplored nexus between the principles and concepts
of the law of nations and domestic constitutional law doctrines dealing with
interstate puzzles analytically similar to those encountered in international
politics. This influence is harder to trace, but it may be more significant in-
sofar as it illuminates solutions to these constitutional puzzles-solutions
that are part of the mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence in a way that
public international law generally is not. The particular puzzle that is our
concern is the sovereignty of the States in the federal system.
A. Theories of Sovereignty at the Founding
Sovereignty, as conceptualized by the founding generation, had two
relevant components. External sovereignty, in Justice Iredell's words, was
a state's power to "regulat[e] [its] intercourse with foreign nations."81 In-
ternal sovereignty referred to a state's "exclusive right of providing for [its]
own government" within its territories.8 2 Typically, both sorts of sover-
eignty would reside in one government; the American political experiment
was to create a system in which the two sovereignties were each matched to
different governments.
An important aspect of sovereignty as it was then understood was ex-
clusivity-the sovereign power could not be shared, at least beyond the
foundational division between the internal and the external. That is to say,
it was not conceivable that internal sovereignty could be jointly wielded by
two governments in one domain; rather, each had to be sovereign in its own
separate sphere.83 Moreover, sovereignty within that sphere could similarly
not be diffused: the notion that a state was not a sovereign state unless su-
preme and indivisible power was vested in one body was so resiliently ca-
nonical that early American attempts in the 1760s to carve out spheres of
exemption within Parliament's legislative sovereignty quickly gave way to
the use of sovereignty as an offensive weapon from without-Parliament
had no authority over the American colonies because the colonial legisla-
tures themselves were sovereign.8 4
Thus, the concept of sovereignty supplied a crucial political theory of
revolution that had to be reconciled with the sovereignty of the States as
parts of the United States once the revolution was won. Because state legis-
latures-not Congress-were the original repositories of legislative sover-
eignty transferred from Parliament by revolution, the dogma of exclusive
sovereignty (in thirteen iterations) stood as an impediment to the creation of
that international law is federal law and countering that Bradley and Goldsmith's proposal is "a muddled
notion that offers only an invitation to chaos").
81 Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 DalU.) 54, 93 (1795) (Iredell, I., dissenting).82 Id.
83 THE FEDERALISTNO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
94 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-54
(1969).
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a "more perfect Union.""5  The theoretical conundrum confronting the
founding generation, then, was to effect a voluntary transfer from the States
of that quantum of sovereignty necessary to make a "general government"
sufficiently powerful to conduct itself as a unitary state actor in its relations
with other nation-states,8 6 while ensuring "domestic Tranquility" among
member states who retained sovereignty within their borders.
The distinction between internal and external sovereignty was a power-
ful means of rationalizing this statebuilding project. The States would re-
tain their respective internal sovereignties, and the federal government
would acquire the States' collective external sovereignty. The solution,
neat in theory, presented difficult problems in practice, especially with re-
spect to the regulation of hybrid interactions among the States and between
individual States and foreign states, as opposed to interactions between all
the States as one unit and foreign states (pure questions of external sover-
eignty), or wholly within one State (pure internal sovereignty issues).
Clearly, the issues of interstate regulation had both external and internal
sovereignty implications-harmonious relations among the States were cru-
cial to national power in external relations, but at the same time, heavy-
handed direction from the general government had to be curtailed for fear of
offending the internal sovereignty of the States, which had voluntarily
agreed to the union.
B. Federal Powers Under the Constitution and the Sovereignty Distinction
The general government's powers in this interstitial region can be
characterized in two ways that correspond roughly to the external and inter-
nal sovereignty distinction. On one hand, the Constitution invested the
three branches of general government with national powers intended to cre-
ate a strong, wealthy, and unified polity where the States were conceived of
as constituent parts of one nation. These powers were of the "command
and control" type-the relevant branch was to regulate with the authority of
a superior over subordinates, and the States were in this sense administra-
tive subunits.8 7 On the other hand, there were powers designed to increase
cooperation and to decrease conflict among the States without denigrating
their individual internal sovereignties-precisely the purpose of public in-
ternational law. As such, these powers--designed to persuade rather than
to coerce-were of the type that might be exercised by an international
governmental institution.
1. Article IV. The "International" Constitution.-Article IV directly
concerns the regulation of relations among the States-it is in this sense the
best example of the Constitution as an international governance project.
85 U.S. CoNST. pmbl.
86 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 144 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419,469-79 (1793) (Jay, C.J.).
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Specifically, the Full Faith and Credit Clause88 formalizes the rule of inter-
national comity; the Privileges and Immunities Clause89 and second and
third clauses of Section 2 can be understood as a universal agreement on re-
ciprocal treatment and extradition; 90 and Section 3 affords constitutional
recognition of the States' territorial sovereignty. 91 Section 4, the Republi-
can Government Guarantee Clause, merits closer attention.
The Section's promise that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government ' 92 makes no
sense as a guarantee of a republican form of national government, as Arti-
cles I, II, and III have already specified in detailed form how that govern-
ment was to be structured, and any transgression of that structure would
suffice as an unconstitutional act in its own right. The promise "to every
State," must mean, rather, a guarantee to the States, or more aptly, to the
citizens constituting "every State," that the federal government would al-
ways act in a manner conducive to a republican form of state government-
one that was representative and responsive to the rights and wishes of its
citizens. 93 This is precisely how Justice Iredell read the Republican Gov-
ernment Guarantee Clause in his famous Chisholm dissent: "The people of
the State created, the people of the State can only change, its Constitution.
Upon this power there is no other limitation but that imposed by the Consti-
tution of the United States; that it must be of the Republican form.''94 And
indeed, the Founders appear to have intended the same meaning, as evi-
88 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Pro-
ceedings of every other State. And the Congress may be general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
89 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
90 U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Jus-
tice, and be found in another State, shall on demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
Id.
No person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into an-
other, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour, buy shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be
due.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cI. 3.
91 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed
or erected with the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two
or more States or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned
as well as of the Congress.
Id.
92 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
93 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, I AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 908-12 (3d ed. 2000). The com-
mentary on the Republican Government Guarantee Clause has generally neglected the Kantian interstate
or international implications of the Clause's structural requirement.
94 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,448 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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denced by James Madison's proposed clarification of the original resolu-
tion, which, though ultimately rejected, was faithful to the intent of the pro-
vision: "The republican constitutions and the existing laws of each state, to
be guaranteed by the United States. '95 The Founders in 1787, desirous of
"peace and concord" among the States, 96 had codified in the clause Kant's
famous "first definitive article of perpetual peace, '97 eight years before he
had called it such in print.
While Article IV may be the most "international" article of the Consti-
tution, we can see a mixing and balancing of national and international
functions in the constitutional design of each branch of the federal govern-
ment. Article II, for example, sets forth an electoral system for the selection
of the President (giving special weight to the sovereignty of the several
States) 98 that is more commonly seen in the selection mechanisms for lead-
ers of international institutions than of unitary democratic states. But in
terms of mission, the designated responsibilities of the President, charged
with the execution of the Constitution and of the laws of the United States,
are overwhelmingly national in the sense that the performance of his duties
are predicated on a vision of the States as parts of one whole. The one no-
table exception (much more important then than now) is the Militia
Clause,99 which envisions the President in the role of a supreme multilateral
force commander in command of the separate levies of the States in the
event of a threat to their collective security.
2. Article T- National Legislative Sovereignty and State Sover-
eignty.-Historically and normatively inclined to the British example, the
Founders placed primary sovereignty in the legislative branch; conse-
quently, the job of balancing internal and external sovereignty in Article I
assumed primary importance in constitutional design. But it was a rela-
tively straightforward assignment in terms of institutional design once the
innovation of a bicameral body with proportional representation in one part
and fixed apportionment in the other was introduced to deal with the big-
gest problem of interstate population and resource inequalities."' More-
over, the venerated model of legislative sovereignty in Great Britain had
generated plentiful commentary and guidance from admirers and critics
95 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 206 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [herein-
after 1 FARRAND].
96 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 423 (argument of Attorney-General Randolph) ("Are not peace and concord
among the states, two of the great ends of the constitution?").
97 See KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE, supra note 33, at 112.
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cls. 2-3.
99 "Te President shall be Commander in Chief.. .of the Militia of the several States, when called
into the actual Service of the United States... U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
100 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 95, at 130-239 (debates of June 6-13, 1787, with respect to the de-
sign and terms of the Houses of Congress).
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alike. 101 As a practical matter, then, because setting up a federal legislative
branch was not all that different from establishing a variant of Parliament,
once the interstate inequality problem was resolved, the British example
sufficed to answer many of the design issues (for example, bicameralism)
the Framers faced. 102
The more complex, international aspects of balancing legislative sov-
ereignty in Article I, for which there was less guidance from domestic prac-
tice, the British model, or political theory, involved constitutionalizing
safeguards that maintained peace among the States while preserving ele-
ments of their status quo internal sovereignty. Specifically, Article I, Sec-
tion 10's list of prohibitions on the States is unmistakably cued to classical
international relations theories with respect to the causes of conflict in inter-
state politics-offensive military capabilities, standing armies, aggressive
trade and finance practices (most notably discriminatory taxes on imports
and exports), and alliances and preemptive mutual defense treaties. 10 3 The
detailed limitations on trade and finance powers in Section 10, and Section
8's grant to Congress of the sweeping power to "regulate Commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"
indicate the extent to which the Founders justly feared the economic causes
of international strife in the late eighteenth-century era of high mercantil-
ism.104 Indeed, Article I, Section 10's prohibitions on the States' treaty-
making and warmaking powers were the successors to identical provisions
in Article 9 of the Articles of Confederation, which were adopted precisely
because of the threat of wars among the colonies over the profitable fur
trade with the Indians.10 5 As early as the Continental Congress of 1776,
101 See, e.g., CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156-66,
325-33 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1997) (1748); VATTEL, supra note 25, at 63 (65 in 1805 ed.) (Bk. I, Ch. II, § 24).
102 See generally 1 FARRAND, supra note 95, at 224-239. This did not meet the approval of all
delegates at the Constitutional Convention. Pierce Butler of South Carolina was particularly hostile to
the British example, complaining that "[w]e are constantly running away with the idea of the excellence
of the British parliament, and with or without reason copying them; when in fact there is no similitude in
our situations." Id. at 238.
103 Section 10 states in part: "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant
letters of marque and reprisal .... " U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The subsequent clause provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net
Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
the Treasury of the United States ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. Section 10 also forbids any state to "lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
104 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 267-69 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 334-35 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (comments of
Governor Randolph, George Mason, and James Madison at the Virginia Convention, June 21, 1788).
105 See VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN INDIAN
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James Wilson had warned that "[n]one should trade with Indians without a
license from Congress. A perpetual war would be unavoidable, if every-
body was allowed to trade with them." 106
The skeptic may reasonably respond that Section 10 should be viewed
as a national project provision inasmuch as its primary intent was to limit
the States' usurpation of foreign policy powers assigned to the new federal
government vis-h-vis foreign countries. In this formulation, Section 10
constitutes merely the negation of the States' powers logically compelled
by the affirmative grant of similar powers to Congress in Section 8: what
Congress may do, the States may not do. This view presumes that the limi-
tations on the States' rights to make war, to make treaties, and to engage in
confrontational trade policies speak predominantly, if not exclusively, to
such capacities in the international rather than the interstate context.
This interpretation ignores the historical realities of the time and the
constitutional text. However inconceivable now, it is likely that the Fram-
ers perceived the threat of war between Massachusetts and New York, or
between eastern Massachusetts and western Massachusetts, 10 7 to be as great
as the threat of another war against England or against Spain. Interstate
trade wars, for one, were legion. After the War for Independence, "[t]he
States passed tariff laws against one another as well as against foreign na-
tions; and, indeed, as far as commerce was concerned, each State treated the
others as foreign nations. There were retaliations, discriminations, and
every manner of trade restrictions and impediments which local ingenuity
and selfishness could devise." 10 8 Disputes between the States over border
lands and overlapping land grants generated as much, if not more, hostil-
ity-including periodic border skirmishes between settlers from different
States. And conflicting claims to lucrative prize ships and spoils of war
seized on the high seas were yet another source of high tension among the
States.109
In the parlance of modem neorealist international relations theory,110
DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONvENTIONS, 1775-1979, at 13-15 (1999). Under the
Articles system, the States had more sweeping treatymaking powers vis-a-vis the Indian tribes, most no-
tably the right to negotiate purchases of Indian land directly. See id. at 15. The States were stripped of
this authority with the passage of the Trade and Intercourse Act, I Stat. 137 (1790).
106 6 JouRNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 1079 (Worthington Chauncey
Ford ed., 1906).
107 See WOOD, supra note 84, at 284-86 (concerning the history of the state constitutional crisis in
Massachusetts of the late 1770's and Shay's Rebellion in 1786).
108 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, I THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 310 (1916); see also CARL BRENT
SwiSHER, AMERICAN CONSTTUTONAL DEVELOPMENT 25-27 (2d ed. 1954).
109 See, e.g., Penhallow v. Doane's Admr's, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 60-63 (1795) (involving dispute be-
tween New Hampshire and Massachusetts citizens over a prize ship seized during the War for Independ-
ence).
Ito See John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SECURITY,




NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
despite the common cultural, socioeconomic, and historical ties shared by
the thirteen newly minted sovereign States, that a security dilemma would
persist amongst them was inevitable."' And whatever unifying value the
ex-colonies' common ties might have had was further discounted by the
trauma of having waged a bloody war of independence against their pro-
genitor, with whom they also shared these deep ties. From this perspective,
the Constitution and the federal institutions it created served, in addition to
the typical supervisory functions of national governments, functions of as-
surance, monitoring, and information-sharing among the States needed to
preserve interstate peace and to allow the newly federated republic suffi-
cient breathing space to incubate.
The constitutional text also supports the contention that parts of Article
I depicted the States as analytically indistinguishable from independent
sovereign countries in their mutual relations and devised international con-
stitutional solutions accordingly. The formulation of Congress's Commerce
power in Article I, Section 8 is illustrative.1 2 The power to regulate com-
merce "among the several States" is listed between such power to regulate
commerce "with foreign Nations" and "with the Indian Tribes," suggesting
equivalency.
Likewise, in Article I, Section 10, the proscription on a State setting
"any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be abso-
lutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws" (without Congress's
consent) is open-ended,113 but we know from historical context that such
tariffs were as commonly exercised against other States as other coun-
tries." 4 The Import-Export Clause was thus surely intended for interstate
and international trade alike without distinction.'15 The prohibition on
States entering "any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation,"1 6 similarly pro-
scribes in one breath treaties, alliances, confederations, and wars among the
States and between a State and foreign countries. Finally, the omnibus re-
III See generally ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
3-57 (1976) (articulating the logic behind the security dilemma that state actors face in their interactions
with each other given uncertainty about the other's intentions).
112 "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
113 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 2; see also art. I, § 9, cl. 5 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles
exported from any State."); art. I, § 9, cl. 6 ("No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from,
one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.").
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A very material
object of [commerce) power [under the Articles of Confederation] was the relief of the States which im-
port and export through other States from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter.").
115 See id. For this reason, Justice Thomas has recently urged the Court to decide the constitutional-
ity of discriminatory state taxation schemes under the Import-Export Clause rather than under its tradi-
tional dormant commerce clause rationale. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,
520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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striction on States entering into "any Agreement or Compact with another
State, or with a foreign Power," or keeping troops, warships, or waging of-
fensive war without Congress's consent,1 7 similarly treats the States as ana-
lytically indistinguishable from foreign countries. This clause, in particular,
seems more like an international mutual security pact than a provision in a
domestic constitution.
3. The National and Interstate Functions of Article Iff Courts.-
Given the role of courts as institutions intended for the peaceful mediation
of disputes, it is not surprising that Article M, like Article I with respect to
Congress, invested the federal judiciary with a robust set of international as
well as national functions. When fulfilling a national function, the federal
courts were to decide cases authoritatively, confident of the binding nature
of their decisions as final arbiters in a hierarchical system, even with States
as parties. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court118 was the para-
digmatic national function, even as to the review of state court judgments,
insofar as the Court was intended in its appellate capacity to act as the na-
tional court of last resort with respect to a decision that had already been
decided by a lower state or federal court.
By contrast, in the exercise of "international" jurisdiction over a con-
troversy, especially one to which a State was party, the Constitution con-
templated that the courts tread carefully-looking to explicit congressional
guidance, deciding only the issue in controversy, and refraining from set-
ting sweeping precedents. In such suits, the federal courts might be under-
stood to have been invested with more conciliatory powers, with the
authority not to make decisions for affirmative national ends, but rather to
arbitrate disputes to preserve interstate peace. Justice Iredell brilliantly cap-
tured the sensitive international function of the judiciary, and how it dif-
fered from the legislative and executive branches in this respect:
The powers of the general government, either of a legislative or executive
nature,... require no aid from any state authority.... The judicial power is of
a peculiar kind. It is indeed commensurate with the ordinary legislative and
executive powers of the general government, ... [b]ut it ... goes further.
Where certain parties are concerned, although the subject in controversy does
not relate to any of the special objects of authority of the general government,
wherein the separate sovereignties of the states are blended in one common
mass of supremacy, yet the general government has a judicial authority ... and
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or
Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay.
Id.
118 US. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
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the legislature of the United States may pass all laws necessary to give such
judicial authority proper effect. So far as states, under the constitution, can be
made legally liable to this authority, so far, to be sure, they are subordinate to
the authority of the United States, and their individual sovereignty is in this re-
spect limited. But it is limited no further than the necessary execution of such
authority requires. The authority extends only to the decision of controversies
in which a state is a party, and providing laws necessary for that purpose. 119
Guidance from Congress was particularly important when appointed
judges of the general government were exercising politically sensitive in-
ternational functions because the States were at least represented in that
body. Indeed, the absence of a congressional statute clearly authorizing ju-
risdiction in private contract claims against States (rather than the State-
party provision of section 13 of the first Judiciary Act) seems to have been
an important reason for Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm.120
Dividing Article III, Section 2's nine enumerated categories of federal
jurisdiction thematically between national and international disputes is il-
luminating. The national category would contain the first four jurisdictional
heads: (1) "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority"; (2) "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public
ministers, and Consuls"; (3) "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion"; and (4) "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.' 21
The international subset would include the next five headings, all referred to
in Article III as "controversies": (1) "between two or more States"; (2) "be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State"; (3) "between Citizens of dif-
ferent States"; (4) "between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under the Grants of different States"; and (5) "between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."'122 "Controversies"
in which the United States is a party could also fall in this category, insofar
as they might involve the courts in international governance functions in the
sense of a supra-State governmental body challenging a State's misconduct
(like the United Nations with respect to the United States' failure to pay
dues).
The international law theory thus presents a new explanation for the
use of "cases" as opposed to "controversies" with respect to Article III's ju-
risdiction headings-a topic that has attracted much attention. 23 Specifi-
119 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,435-36 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 436-37 ("It follows, therefore, unquestionably, I think, that looking at the act of Con-
gress, which I consider is on this occasion the limit of our authority (whatever further might be constitu-
tionally, enacted), we can exercise no authority in the present instance ....
121 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
122 Id.
123 Compare Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 240 (1985) (arguing that Article III establishes "two tiers" of
federal jurisdiction: mandatory for "all cases" and subject to Congress's discretion for "controversies"),
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cally, "cases" could be understood to refer to jurisdictional headings in
which the federal courts were to adjudicate in a more binding law-like man-
ner as authoritative national tribunals, paradigmatically in federal criminal
matters. On the other hand, "controversies" delineated politically-sensitive
international jurisdictional headings where the federal courts were to func-
tion more cautiously and with the support of Congress, tending more to me-
diation than adjudication, and to exclusively civil matters as opposed to
"cases" that could be either civil or criminal.124 Tellingly, Justice Iredell
defined the law of nations as the law governing "controversies between na-
tion and nation."'2
The analytical sharpness of the bifurcation glosses over the important
possibility that a particular suit against a State might implicate both national
and international functions such as, for example, a diversity suit brought by
a citizen or a subject of a foreign state or a citizen of another state that also
arises under federal law, in which case a choice would be forced between
the court acting authoritatively at the expense of state sovereignty or vice
versa. The Eleventh Amendment, if read plainly, appeared to address at
once the interpretation of one "Cases" heading in the "national" category-
the "arising under" jurisdiction-and two "international" headings of fed-
eral jurisdiction: "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of an-
other State" and "between a State ... and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects." By its unqualified prescription, lifted from the canons of interna-
tional law, it seems to be saying in no uncertain terms that in these "cases"
and "controversies" (collectively, "suits"), the federal courts must respect
the States' sovereignty by refusing to acknowledge that noncitizens without
claims to that sovereignty have private causes of action against them.
It is worth noting that of these nine classes of cases and controversies,
the only instances in which Article III expressly accorded the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction were cases affecting ambassadors and public
ministers and where States were parties 20---the singling-out of these two
Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499
(1990) (contending that the Judiciary Act of 1789 is consistent with the two-tiered explanation), and
Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1651
(1990) (defending the two-tiered theory against critics), with Daniel J. Meltzer, he History and Struc-
ture ofArticle Iff, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569 (1990) (contesting the fit of Amar's hypothesis with histori-
cal evidence and the Judiciary Act of 1789, and debating the wisdom of its implication that "all cases"
including, for example, admiralty cases, are more important by virtue of mandatory jurisdiction, than
"controversies" involving the United States or states as parties).
124 Cf Meltzer, supra note 123, at 1574-76.
12 See James Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Caro-
lina (May 12, 1794), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATEs, 1789-1800, at 454, 459 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds, 1988) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY].
126 "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a
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categories makes perfect sense from an international law perspective, if one
were to equate the sovereign dignity of the States with that of nation-states.
In these two sets of cases, the federal judiciary was called upon to exercise
international functions of acute political sensitivity, the former in a purely
external sense, the latter in an internal sense. This sensitivity justified spe-
cific assignment to the highest court of the general government as a sign of
respect for the sovereign dignity of the foreign states (of whom the law of
nations considered ambassadors and public ministers full representatives) 27
and the States that would be parties before the Court.128 Justice Iredell rea-
soned similarly in his Circuit Court opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, con-
cluding that the latter half of this original jurisdiction was exclusive to the
Supreme Court: "It may also fairly be presumed that the several States
thought it important to stipulate that so awful and important a Trial [to
which a State is party] should not be cognizable by any Court but the Su-
preme."' 29 The conclusion was not challenged when the Supreme Court
heard Chisholm under its original jurisdiction. 130
Although it has long been accepted that lower federal courts and state
courts may have concurrent jurisdiction over all such cases"' with the ex-
ception of "controversies between two or more States,"' 32 it is a telling in-
sight into Justice Iredell's understanding of sovereign dignity that he
continued to maintain that the Supreme Court alone possessed original ju-
risdiction for all cases involving foreign emissaries and States as parties. In
127 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
Public ministers of every class are the immediate representatives of their sovereigns. All questions
in which they are concerned are so directly connected with the public peace, that, as well for the
preservation of this as out of respect to the sovereignties they represent, it is both expedient and
proper that such questions should be submitted in the first instance to the highest judicatory of the
nation.
Id.; see also VATTEL, supra note 25, at 523.
128 See California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65-66 (1979) ("The constitutional grant to this Court of
original jurisdiction is limited to cases involving the States and the envoys of foreign nations. The
Framers seem to have been concerned with matching the dignity of the parties to the status of the
court.").
129 Farquhar v. Georgia (C.C.D. Ga. 1791) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 51, at 154.
130 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 419 (1793). None of the Justices disputed the
circuit court's conclusion.
131 See Ames v. Kansas ex rel Johnson, 111 U.S. 449 (1884) (recognizing the constitutionality of
concurrent jurisdiction in state courts in such cases); Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884) (acknowledg-
ing the constitutionality of concurrent jurisdiction in the lower federal courts in cases "affecting Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994).
The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All actions or proceed-
ings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are
parties; (2) All controversies between the United States and a State; (3) All actions or proceedings
by a State against the citizens of another State or against aliens.
Id.; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 294-98.
132 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994) ("The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all controversies between two or more States.").
1060
Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment
a circuit court case heard two months after Chisholm involving a Genoese
consul charged with a misdemeanor, the circuit panel upheld its jurisdiction
by a vote of two to one. Justice Iredell was the emphatic dissenter:
I do not concur in this opinion, because it appears to me, that for obvious rea-
sons of public policy, the Constitution intended to vest an exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the Supreme Court, upon all questions relating to the Public Agents of
Foreign Nations. Besides, the context of the judiciary article of the Constitu-
tion seems fairly to justify the interpretation, that the word original, means ex-
clusive, jurisdiction. 133
Though his position was never law (though it was shared, among others, by
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 81),134 it demonstrates a logical con-
sistency that should inform analysis of Iredell's conception of what sover-
eign dignity required of the federal judiciary in Chisholm.
C. The Problem of Many Sovereigns: Vattel and the Law of Nations
The preceding discussion explained why it makes sense to read the
Constitution as treating the States like sovereign nation-states in certain re-
spects, and to view the federal government's role, accordingly, as similar to
that of an international governance institution, relying more on cooperation
than coercion in these matters. Of course, for the international law theory
to be a plausible explanation of the Eleventh Amendment, it is necessary to
show, in addition to issue congruence between American domestic federal-
ism and international politics, that the founding generation was knowledge-
able about international law, and that the Founders consciously applied this
knowledge to these problems. This burden of proof is not a particularly dif-
ficult one because there is abundant evidence that the founding generation,
including, most importantly, Justice Iredell, was thoroughly well-versed in
the state-of-the-art literature on international law and politics. And there
was a primus inter pares among these works, the previously cited interna-
tional law treatise by the Swiss writer Emmerich de Vattel; it was the most
popular and widely available tract of its kind in late eighteenth-century
America---cited twice in the Chisholm opinions.
Vattel's The Law of Nations; or Principles on of the Law of Nature
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns,135 first pub-
lished in French in 1758, is now a forgotten book, but it was once one of the
most influential legal treatises in American constitutional law.136 A search
of Westlaw's electronic database revealed references to Vattel's book in
133 United States v. Ravarra, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793). Strangely, the relevant volume
(two) of Documentary History of the Supreme Court makes no reference to this case, nor does it appear
that Justice Iredell issued grand jury charges specific to the case.
134 See supra note 127.
135 See supra note 25.
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161 Supreme Court cases before 1945,137 more references than to any of the
multiple works individually or combined of Vattel's international law peers
who are more commonly known today like Hugo Grotius (73 references) or
Samuel Pufendorf (25),138 or eighteenth-century political theorists like the
Baron de Montesquieu (16), to whom the Founders turned for guidance on
federalism issues.
American leaders, it is known, possessed at least three copies of Vat-
tel's book as early as 1775. Benjamin Franklin, in a letter to a Swiss sym-
pathizer of the American cause who had sent the copies, noted the book's
importance to the Founders:
I am much obliged by the kind present you have made us of your edition of
Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising State
make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations. Accordingly, that
copy which I kept (after depositing one in our own public library here, and
sending the other to the College of Massachusetts Bay, as you directed) has
been continually in the hands of the members of our Congress now sitting.13 9
These copies were probably in French 140 (which many of the Founders in-
137 The electronic search was conducted in the Westlaw SCT-OLD directory of Supreme Court
cases prior to 1945 using "Vattel," "Vat. & sovereign!," and "Vatt." term searches. The search yielded
145 hits for "Vattel," 11 hits for "Vat. & sovereign!," and 31 hits for "Vatt." Duplicates were eliminated
to yield the final sum of 161 documents. Of these, 152 were opinions in cases up to 1901; there were 9
more references to Vattel in cases between 1905 and 1934. A search of modern Supreme Court opinions
after 1945 in the SCT directory revealed 8 citations to Vattel, with 3 references in cases decided in 1997
and 1998: apparently, Vattel is coming back into vogue. A cursory inspection of the cases indicates that
of the 169 references, at least 29 were maritime or admiralty prize cases involving ships, 13 involved
disputes between states, 9 concerned suits between a state and a private party, 1 between a state and an
Indian tribe, and at least 5 addressed Congress's immigration powers. Among the cases in which Vattel
was mentioned are some of the great cases of the early Supreme Court such as Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1812), Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819), Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). See also FRANCIS STEPHEN
RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE BACKGROUND OF EMMERICH DE
VATTEL'SLEDROITDES GENS 284 (1975) (citing research of Professor Edwin Dickinson indicating that
between 1789 and 1820, Vattel was cited 92 times in pleadings, 38 times in Supreme Court opinions,
and directly quoted in 22 Supreme Court opinions).
138 Another popular eighteenth-century writer on the law of nations who is now virtually unknown
was Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 27-29 (1967), who was mentioned in 17 Supreme Court cases before 1945.
139 WHARTON, UNITED STATES REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 64 (1889), cited
in Abraham C. Weinfeld, Comment, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean by
"Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CH. L. REV. 453, 458 (1936).
140 See Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENs, OU
PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE, APPLIQUES A LA CONDUITE ET AUX AFFAIRES DES NATIONS ET DES
SOVERAINs [THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND
AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS) iii, xxix-xxx (James Brown Scott ed., Carnegie Inst. of Wash.
1916) (1758) (published as part of The Classics of International Law series).
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cluding Justices Iredel 1 41 and Wilson read), but the first English translation
had been published in 1759,142 and by the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention in 1787, another English edition and nine French-language editions
had been published. 143 Long before the printing of the first American edi-
tion in New York in 1796 144-coincidentally, only months prior to the es-
tablishment of the Tazewell Commission to update Congress on the status
of the States' ratification of the Eleventh Amendment and the Bill of
Rights14 5-the frequency of reference to Vattel's book in early American
letters, newspapers, and pamphlets indicates that the book was widely
available and a leading work in the canon of early American political theory
and rhetoric.146 At least one famed Antifederalist (and therefore protective
of state sovereignty) was a particularly avid fan: "Vattel's authority was so
great before the courts that prior to arguments before the federal circuit
court in Richmond in 1790, Patrick Henry did not hesitate to send his
grandson 60 miles on horseback to look for the work that could permit him
to win over the judges."147
It is easy to see why the Framers would have looked frequently to Vat-
tel's Law of Nations for statebuilding advice. Certainly, they must have
identified closely with the ideas and experience of a Swiss philosopher of
law and politics, the citizen of a thriving federated republic. And as a prac-
tical matter, the book was structured as an eminently readable handbook on
141 I am indebted to Judge Whichard for this information.
142 Lapradelle, supra note 140, at lviii.
143 Id. at Ivi-lix.
144 Id. at lviii. American editions after the first proliferated in rapid-fire succession; this Article
cites from the fourth American edition published in Northampton, Massachusetts in 1820, published a
scant 23 years after the first. There were at least seven more American editions published in the nine-
teenth century, the most significant being Joseph Chitty's new translation first printed in London in 1833
and in America in 1844. Id. at lviii-lix. The Chitty translation was reprinted eight times between 1854
and 1872. However, the popularity of the book waned thereafter-the last American printing was the
Camegie Endowment for International Peace's reprint of the 1758 original French edition in 1916. Id.;
see also HENKIN ET AL., supra note 136, at xxv-xxvi (noting Vattel's decline in popularity after World
War I). Similarly, Vattel was mentioned in only 10 Supreme Court cases after the end of World War I
and then never as the primary authority for a rule of decision as in some eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
tury cases. See supra note 137; Lapradelle, supra note 140, at xxxvii.
145 See Eleventh Amendment, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 51, at 601. New York had
ratified the Amendment on March 27, 1794. See id. at 625.
146 James Wilson was especially fond of Vattel, citing him in his correspondence, his comments at
the state and federal ratifying conventions, his opinions, and his instructions to grand juries. See 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION,
AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 454 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 1861) [hereinafter 2 ELLIOT]; Weinfeld, supra note 139, at 459; James Wilson, Charge to the Grand
Jury of a Special Session of the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania (July 22, 1793), reprinted
in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 414-23 (citing Vattel eight different times, Black-
stone's Commentaries but twice, in his charge to the grand jury empanelled in connection with the Citi-
zen Genet affair).
147 Lapradelle, supra note 140, at xxxvi (footnote omitted) (author's translation).
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how a state should deal with day-to-day foreign and domestic governance
problems. 48 It was thus starkly different from any of the predominantly
theoretical and exposition-oriented political works of the time.
Vattel's influence on American understanding and judicial decisions
touching on substantive international law has already been documented by
legal scholars. 149 Significantly, this included Vattel's pronouncements on
the nature of sovereignty in the society of nations. 50 One account of the
Delphic force that Vattel's pronouncements had on early American leaders,
at the same time the Eleventh Amendment was being discussed in state leg-
islatures across the nation, is particularly illuminating:
During the cabinet meeting [in mid-April 1793 concerning courses of action
with respect to mounting hostilities between Britain and France] Hamilton, in
arguing that the turmoil in France and in Europe gave the United States
grounds to suspend the treaties [of alliance and commerce with France], ap-
pealed to the authority of Vattel. Jefferson was not swayed by the citation, but
it did cause Edmund Randolph, the attomey general, to reconsider his opposi-
tion to Hamilton's proposal. Unfortunately, a copy of Vattel's work was not
available at the moment and the meeting soon adjourned, in part so that the
law-of-nations authorities could be consulted.1
5
'
But the Supreme Court has also taken guidance and cited from Vattel
in decisions that did not implicate the substantive law of nations at all such
as cases involving the proper exercise of eminent domain 152 and the sover-
148 See RUDDY, supra note 137, at 285-310 (attributing Vattel's appeal to his readable style, his ra-
tionalist method, his relevant discussion of the law of nations in action, and his systematic treatment of
topics of interest). As Ruddy points out, the absence of ponderous citations and quotations that made
Vattel so readable did not meet the approval of all lawyers. Id. at 303-04.
149 See JAMES KENT, COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 36 (1878) ("[Vattel's book] has been
cited more freely than that of any other public jurist, and is still the statesman's manual and oracle.");
DANIEL GEORGE LANG, FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
BALANCE OF POWER 95 (1985) (noting that Hamilton called Vattel "perhaps the most accurate and ap-
proved of the writers on the law of nations" (citation omitted)); Jay, supra note 17, at 823 ("In ascertain-
ing principles of the law of nations, lawyers and judges [in eighteenth century America] relied heavily
on continental treatise writers, Vattel being the most often consulted .... An essential part of a sound
legal education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, among others.").
ISO See DANIEL GARDNER, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1844). Gardner justified the
United States' recognition of the Republic of Texas as a sovereign nation after its independence from
Mexico by offering that such conduct was consistent with Vattel:
Vattel, B. Ist, Ch. V, S. 69, speaking of sovereignty being inherent in a nation and not in a prince
or executive says, 'Every true sovereignty is unalienable in its nature,' and he denies that a prince
or any national officers can, without a special authority, assign a nation's sovereignty to another,
as the nation alone can do it.
Id. at 100-01; see also Lapradelle, supra note 140, at xxxvii-xxxviii.
151 LANG, supra note 149, at 88.
152 See United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883) (citing Vattel for the proposition that
"[tihe power to take private property for public uses, generally termed the right of eminent domain, be-
longs to every independent government. It is an incident of sovereignty, and ... requires no constitu-
tional recognition.").
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eign's plenary powers over immigration and deportation. 153 As already
noted, for example, Vattel was specifically referenced twice in the case of
Chisholm v. Georgia,154 which had nothing to do with international law.
Moreover, just as this Article argues that the conceptualization of state sov-
ereignty in Vattel's work is the basis of the States' sovereignty as under-
stood in the Eleventh Amendment, other scholars have argued that the
difference between "treaties" and "agreements or compacts" as specified in
Article I, Section 10 similarly originates in Vattel. t55 There is also a fasci-
nating resemblance between governance concerns that Vattel alone articu-
lated among principal political writers of his time and specific provisions of
the Constitution. For example, Vattel's objection to quartering soldiers in
private homes in peacetime bears an uncanny likeness to the Third
Amendment t56 and his lengthy discourse on "titles and honours" accorded
153 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893):
The statements of leading commentators to the law of nations are to the same effect.
Vattel says: "Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country, when he
cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger, or doing it a manifest injury. What it
owes to itself, the care of its own safety, gives it this right; and, in virtue of its natural liberty, it
belongs to the nation to judge whether its circumstances will or will not justify the admission of
the foreigner." "Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that
they will corrupt the manners of the citizens; that they will create religious disturbances, or occa-
sion any other disorder, contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is even obliged,
in this respect, to follow the rules which prudence dictates."
Id. at 707-08 (citing VATrEL, Bk. 1, ch. 19, §§ 230-31, apparently, the Chitty edition of 1879).
154 Justice James Wilson, the author of the longest and most famous of the majority opinions, was
very familiar with Vattel's work, and actually referenced him in his opinion as standing for the proposi-
tion that "every state, which governs itself without any dependence on another power, is a sovereign
state:' Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 n.(a) (1793). As discussed infra Part III, Wilson
admitted that although Georgia may indeed be such a state, popular sovereignty resided in its citizens,
who in ratifying the national Constitution, had granted the Supreme Court the power to decide the case
in its capacity as the supreme national tribunal. Chisholm, 2. U.S. (2 DalI.) at 457. In terms of the theo-
retical framework of this article, Wilson's reasoning represents the position that the national project
should be privileged over the international project with respect to the decision of state-alien contract
disputes of the sort in Chisholm. Edmund Randolph, the U.S. Attorney General in 1793 and a colleague
of Wilson's on the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention, quoted from Vattel on an un-
related point in his arguments on behalf of Chisholm before the Court. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 428
("Is not a state capable of making a promise? Certainly; as a state is a moral person, being an assem-
blage of individuals, who are moral persons. Vat. B.1 s.2.").
155 See I ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARiES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA IA, app. at 310 (1803) (assuming that the Constitution simply adopted
Vattel's definition of "agreement or compact" in Article III, Section 10, clause 3); Weinfeld, supra note
139, at 460-64 ("It is my contention that the 'agreement or compact' mentioned in the Constitution is
the 'agreement convention, compact' described in [Book II, Chapter XII, Sections] 153 and 192 of Vat-
tel.').
156 Vattel wrote: "When the soldier is not in the field, there is a necessity of quartering him. This
burden falls on house keepers; but as it is attended with many inconveniences to the people, it becomes
... a wise and equitable govemment, to ease them of it as far as possible." VATTFEL, supra note 25, at
363 (Bk. III, Ch. II, § 11). The Third Amendment reads: "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be pre-
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to a sovereign by citizens and other nations157 harkens to the prophylactic
Title Clause of Article 1.158
Vattel's extensive discussion of water rights is perhaps most illustra-
tive of his instructive value and enormous influence on the jurisprudence of
the new republic. The doctrinal consequence of England's insular and pre-
dominantly nonriverine geography was a drought of common law on con-
flicting State claims to bodies of water or land-abutting bodies of water that
have changed their flow. Of course, such border disputes were common-
place among the early American states and the cause of much interstate
strife. In the absence of common-law precedents, the early Supreme Court
sometimes drew rules of decision exclusively from Vattel's book. For ex-
ample, in the seminal water rights' case Handly's Lessee v. Anthony,159 Jus-
tice Marshall resolved a border dispute between Indiana and Kentucky
concerning land along the Ohio River by applying Vattel's rule that if "the
country which borders on a river, has no other limits than the river itself,
... it enjoys the right of alluvion."'160 Indeed, Justice Marshall so valued
Vattel's authority that he did not feel the need to cite any other cases or au-
thorities to justify the holding in this case that was the literal wellspring of
the Supreme Court's riverine water-rights jurisprudence.161
It is ironic given the current Supreme Court's general refusal to accord
deference to international court adjudications 62 that this body of Supreme
Court jurisprudence, so important to the federal system of the fledgling re-
scribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III.
157 See VATTEL, supra note 25, at 211-14.
158 "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States; And no Person holding any Office of
Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolu-
ment, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State." U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 9. Vattel wrote: "If the conductor of the state is sovereign, . . . he may himself ordain what title
and honours ought to be paid him, unless the fundamental laws have determined them...." VA'rTEL,
supra note 25, at 211 (emphasis added).
159 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374 (1820).
160 Id. at 379-380.
"In case of doubt," says Vattel, "every country lying upon a river, is presumed to have no other
limits but the river itself; because nothing is more natural than to take a river for a boundary, when
a state is established on its borders; and wherever there is a doubt, that is always to be presumed
which is most natural and most probable."
"If," says the same author, "the country which borders on a river, has no other limits than the
river itself, it is in the number of territories that have natural or indetermined limits, and it enjoys
the right ofalluvion."
Any gradual accretion of land, then, on the Indiana side of the Ohio, would belong to Indiana, and
it is not very easy to distinguish between land thus formed, and land formed by the receding of the
water.
Id. (citing VATrEL, supra note 25, at 180-81 (Bk. I, Ch. XXII, § 267)); see also Oklahoma v. Texas,
260 U.S. 606, 646-47 (1923) (citing the same rule from Vattel).
161 Handly's Lessee, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 379-80; cf Lapradelle, supra note 140, at xxxv-xxxvi
(listing instances in the history of the early Republic in which a citation to Vattel carried the day with
respect to the resolution of important constitutional issues).
162 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam) (denying certiorari).
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public, was grounded in the writings of a foreign philosopher of interna-
tional law and relations. In a fascinating case of historical feedback, the
U.S. Supreme Court's water rights jurisprudence, refined over time in the
crucible of sensitive interstate border disputes, now constitutes a primary
source of international law in transnational water rightg cases. 163 This feed-
back reminds us that interstate water and boundary disputes, notwithstand-
ing their adjudication in the American national Supreme Court, were and
continue to be analytically indistinguishable from international disputes.
Consequently, it was only natural for the early Court to turn to international
law to decide such cases. And just as the early Court looked to interna-
tional law and specifically to Vattel for guidance as to the interpretation and
execution of its judicial power to decide water rights cases under the "State-
State" and "land grant" jurisdictional headings of Article III, Section 2, it
seems reasonable that the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment similarly
looked to international law for insight into how to protect the sovereign
dignity of States involved in interstate and international disputes.
III. FrrrING THEORY TO EVIDENCE
Part II made the argument that the Constitution, in appropriate situa-
tions, contemplates the exercise of federal power in a way that treats the
States as separate sovereign nations, and presented evidence that the found-
ing generation was knowledgeable of the law of nations and routinely im-
ported its rules in these situations. Part I explained why the literal language
of the Eleventh Amendment is consistent with the theory that the Amend-
ment applied the international law rule that individuals without a claim to
the sovereignty of a State (whether because they are citizens of other States
or citizens or subjects of foreign states) have no legal rights against the
State. This Part surveys evidence as to how the Eleventh Amendment spe-
cifically, and state sovereign immunity more generally, were understood by
the founding generation. The unsurprising conclusion is that the Eleventh
Amendment seems to have been taken to mean exactly what it says in the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that the concepts of sov-
ereign equality and dignity underlying the international rule similarly in-
formed the Framers' idea of state sovereign immunity.
As an initial matter, there is no "smoking gun" evidence that the Con-
stitution barred private suits against the States, nor that it explicitly author-
ized them.1t4 Advocates of the federal-question immunity and diversity
theories-having dismissed the language as a valid reference to meaning-
have turned instead to different sorts of largely circumstantial evidence to
support their explanations of the Amendment. Once again, only a modest
163 See, e.g., Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bets. v. Namib.), 1999 WL 1693057 (I.CJ.
Dec. 13, 1999). This opinion cites Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 619 (1933), which in turn
cites Handly's Lessee, see id. at 603, 606, 615.
164 See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 14, at 1071-72.
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summary highlighting the most importance pieces of evidence seems ap-
propriate, as the literature on both sides is rich and thorough and it would be
pointless to say much more.
A. Evidence for the Federal-Question Immunity Theory
Advocates of the federal-question immunity theory rely generally on
three types of evidence. First, they present rhetoric in The Federalist and
ratification debates by renowned Federalists responding to Antifederalist
concerns about the States' sovereignty with language implying that the
Constitution intended absolute immunity from private suits for unconsent-
ing States.1 65 Second, they refer to the hostile reaction to the Chisholm de-
cision and the rapidity with which the Eleventh Amendment was drafted
and enacted in response as proof that Chisholm had misconstrued the proper
scope of state sovereign immunity that the Eleventh Amendment was in-
tended to restore. 166 The inference, of course, is that the symptoms and cure
were too drastic to believe that the disease was something as trivial as a
technical misunderstanding about diversity jurisdiction (that States could
not be defendants in diversity suits brought by private parties). Third, they
refer to the sovereign immunity of the British crown as probative of a
common-law rule of absolute sovereign immunity that the States inher-
ited. 167
All of this evidence is consistent with the international law theory and
with a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment; most of it is actually bet-
ter explained by it. Regarding statements about the sovereign immunity of
States from private suits by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John
Marshall, all such references were delivered in the context of debates about
Article III's grant of jurisdiction as to "controversies ... between a State
and Citizens of another State." Their comments, in the Federalist Papers
and at the federal Constitutional Convention and state ratifying conven-
tions, addressed the proposed State-noncitizen diversity provision of Article
III only, not, as the constitutional immunity theorists imply, the "arising
under" heading which might encompass suits brought by a State's own citi-
zens, or as to a heading that simply did not exist providing for jurisdiction
as to "controversies between a State and Citizens of another State or of the
State." John Marshall, for instance, noted:
165 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-18 (1999) (citing such statements in The Federalist
No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) and comments to the same effect at the Virginia ratifying convention by
James Madison and John Marshall); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 69, 70-71 nn.12-13
(1996).
166 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 719-27 (characterizing the reaction of the States to the Chisholm
decision as "a profound shock" that inspired immediate drafting and near-unanimous support of the
Eleventh Amendment to correct its perceived affront to state sovereignty); see also WARREN, supra note
51, at 96-102.
167 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 ("When the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in
English law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its own courts.').
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With respect to disputes between a state and citizens of another state, its ju-
risdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence.... It is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court. The intent
is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I
contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they, there will
be partiality in it if a State cannot be defendant.... It is necessary to be so,
and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which
does not prevent its being plaintiff.168
Of course, the centerpiece of this sort of historical evidence presented by
federal-question immunity advocates is Alexander Hamilton's self-
professed "digression from the immediate subject of this paper" in Federal-
ist 81:169
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty,
is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, there-
fore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The
circumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State sover-
eignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation and need not be re-
peated here. A recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us that
there is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption
of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own
way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of
good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on
the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive
force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To
what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they
owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, it could not be done
without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the federal
courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the
State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would
be altogether forced and unwarrantable. 170
As with the oft-quoted comments by Marshall, it is readily apparent
that Hamilton's "digression" addressed only and specifically the case of
noncitizens suing sovereign States. To begin, he prefaced the quoted pas-
sage by saying: "It has been suggested that an assignment of the public se-
curities of one State to the citizens of another would enable them to
prosecute that State in the federal courts for the amount of those securi-
168 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTIUTION 555-56 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (emphasis added).
169 The passage figures prominently in both the Seminole Tribe and Alden majority opinions. See
Alden, 527 U.S. at 716-17; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S at 54, 69, 70-71 nn.12 & 13.
170 TIE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
1069
96:1027 (2002)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ties.' 171 Since it was then understood that the suability of a sovereign state
was a matter of the state's own local laws, "the general sense and the gen-
eral practice of mankind" can only be a reference to the practice of the law
of nations, under which a noncitizen lacked direct recourse for the violation
of contractual rights by a sovereign state, but would have to depend on his
own sovereign state for vindication of his rights by legal or other means, in-
cluding "waging war against the contracting State.' 7 2
Of course, the international law theory's sovereign equality principle
supplies a powerful and precise justification for the "unusual vehemence"
that the State noncitizen jurisdictional heading inspired among critics that is
wholly independent of the unduly broad and statist inference that the fed-
eral-question immunity proponents have drawn. As previously noted,
whether the judicial power would extend to a suit arising under federal law
against a State and brought by its own citizens is a different and much more
difficult question that was possibly not even contemplated by the Framers
because of its problematic fit with the canonical political theory of wholly
exclusive spheres of federal and state sovereignty.
The same criticism can be leveled with as much force against the sec-
ond sort of evidence presented by the Alden majority---evidence of the
"profound shock" hypothesis. 73 That there was a violent reaction to Chis-
holm is certainly true as an historical matter, and the federal-question im-
munity advocates are correct to see this as a powerful critique of the
diversity theory's admittedly more technical interpretation. But once again,
they seem to be drawing an overbroad inference from the facts. That is to
say, why is it necessary to conclude, from the quick and swift reaction of
the States and the terse, carefully chosen language of the constitutional
amendment that resulted, that the sense of outrage was directed at the
thought that a State had been haled into federal court by a mere individual,
rather than outrage at the notion that one South Carolinian could sue in fed-
eral court for money from the sovereign people of Georgia? It seems the
broader proposition-that even a Georgian had no claim to the money in
Georgia's treasury (for instance, to recoup taxes he believed to have been
garnished unfairly)-might have been considered a far less outrageous
claim, even in those days. The latter conclusion seems equally, if not
clearly more consistent with this evidence of a strong public outrage, the
facts of the case in Chisholm, and, of course, the language of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Evidence of the British Crown's immunity at common law is interest-
ing from an historical point of view and is also consistent with the interna-
tional law theory's proposition that the sovereign may be subject to private
causes of action only for fundamental or constitutional violations (for ex-
171 Id. at 487.
172 Id.
173 "The decision fell upon the country with a profound shock." WARREN, supra note 51, at 96.
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ample, those involving taxation or the taking of property without just com-
pensation). To the extent that the sovereign enjoys immunity from com-
mon-law as opposed to constitutional claims (Justice Iredell's point in the
Chisholm dissent),174 the international law theory is in full accord. And as a
matter of political theory, preeminent sovereignty in Great Britain resided
in Parliament at the time, so the proper analogy would be whether Parlia-
ment, not the King, could be subject to suit for money damages. As the
Framers justified the American Revolution itself largely on the basis of
what they considered lawful grievances by sovereign citizens against Par-
liament for taxation without adequate representation, it seems strange, if not
wholly inconsistent, that they would think that citizens with a stake in a
State's sovereignty would have no lawful right of recourse in the courts
with respect to money that they themselves had contributed to the State's
treasury.
B. Evidence for the Diversity Theory
Proponents of the diversity theory also rely on history to contest the
notion that there was consensus as to state sovereign immunity;175 they too
present three general types of affirmative evidence. First, they point to the
fact that state immunity was never truly absolute in the constitutional
scheme, as Article Im expressly granted federal jurisdiction over suits
against States brought by other States, by other nations, and implicitly, by
the United States.176 Second, they emphasize the limitations on the States
placed by the Constitution, which they impute to an intent to protect the
citizens (in whom sovereignty rightly reposed) from State over-reaching-
an intent that would be contradicted by the denial of private remedies to
victimized citizens. 177 Third, they refer to statements in post-Amendment
Supreme Court decisions before Hans v. Louisiana178 that "are consistent
with an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as merely narrowing the
jurisdiction of the state-diversity clause."179 In addition, Judge Fletcher, in
a response to Professors Massey and Marshall, has raised a number of ob-
jections to the literal interpretation of the Amendment based on historical
evidence which need to be addressed.18 0
The fact that Article III allows suits against States by other States, for-
eign states, and the United States is fully consistent with, and indeed com-
pelled by, the sovereign equality principle in a way that it would not be
174 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,435 (1793).
175 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-09, 142-58 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
176 See, eg., Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 14, at 1072.
177 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 14, at 1427.
178 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
179 Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 14, at 1084.
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under the diversity theory. Allowing such suits is the affirmative "yin" to
the negative "yang" of the proscription of any such suits by citizens of other
States or citizens or subjects of foreign states. That is to say, if the Eleventh
Amendment fully tracked the language of Article III's "State-foreign" di-
versity clause and proscribed suits by "foreign States, Citizens, or Sub-
jects," (as the current doctrine now holds) it would be inconsistent with the
sovereign equality principle; although it would not pose problems at all for
the diversity theory.
The second sort of evidence-a concern for the rights of the people
vis-A-vis the States-is also consistent with the international law theory,
which, however, takes a more nuanced view by suggesting that this concern
had to be balanced with a respect for the States' sovereignty and that the
exercise of judicial power over suits against States brought by noncitizens
was one area in which the compromise worked to the benefit of the States.
Moreover, while the argument of protecting individual rights is persuasive
with respect to noncitizens who were still citizens of the United States, it is
not clear why the rationale should apply to foreign citizens or subjects, and,
accordingly, why the Amendment fails to make any distinction between
noncitizens who are citizens of other States and those who are not.
Finally, while it is true that the diversity interpretation is more consis-
tent with early post-Eleventh Amendment Supreme Court pronouncements
than the federal-question immunity theory,181 the international law theory is
quite clearly the most consistent. In every case in which the applicability of
the Eleventh Amendment was at issue during his tenure, Justice Marshall
stuck by the Amendment's literal language and declared it inapplicable to
suits brought by citizens against their own States and by foreign states,
notwithstanding the current doctrine's contrary position in both instances. 182
In Cohens v. Virginia,183 for example, the Court affirmed a Virginia state
court conviction of Virginians who sold, in Virginia, District of Columbia
lottery tickets that Congress had authorized for sale in the District but
which state law prohibited.18 4 In so doing, Marshall rejected Virginia's ar-
gument that the Eleventh Amendment applied because the case, before the
Court on a writ of error from the state court, was not a "suit" within the
181 Compare Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) ("It must be conceded that the last observa-
tion of the Chief Justice does favor the argument of the plaintiff [that the Eleventh Amendment does not
apply to in-state citizens]."), with Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 14, at 1086 ("Mar-
shall's statement [in Osborn v. Bank of United States] is carefully limited to out-of-state and foreign
citizens. But it is possible to read the statement to mean only that federal courts could not entertain such
suits without more-that is to say, without some basis for jurisdiction other than the alignment of the
parties.").
182 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-11 (extending the Eleventh Amendment's bar to suits against states
brought by its own citizens); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 331-32 (1934) (holding the Eleventh
Amendment to prohibit suits against states brought by foreign states).
183 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
184 Id. at 404.
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meaning of the Amendment,185 and alternatively, because the defendants
were Virginia citizens and the Amendment only applied to suits brought by
"Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." 186 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,187 Marshall clarified that
the Amendment was limited to its plain language-to suits against States,
not state officers, 188 brought by "citizens of other States, or aliens. '189 In
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,190 he yet again showed his commitment to the
Amendment's plain meaning in assuming that if the Cherokee Nation were
a foreign state, the Amendment would not bar its suit against Georgia. 191
As previously discussed, the international law interpretation would not
preclude Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state-court decisions be-
cause the Court in such cases would be acting in its "national function" ca-
pacity as court of last resort in a hierarchical judicial system with respect to
the interpretation of the supreme law of the land,192 rather than as a media-
tor of first instance in cases involving the sovereign States. This is fully
consistent with the first half of Marshall's construction of the Eleventh
Amendment in Cohens, which, unlike his literal interpretation of its party
status requirement, remains good law. 93 It also explains the Marshall
Court's failure to even mention the Eleventh Amendment in Worcester v.
Georgia,194-- a case in which the Court overturned a state court decision in
a suit brought by a noncitizen against the State of Georgia-a party align-
ment that a strict reading of the Amendment would appear to prohibit. 95
Similarly, in Exparte Madrazzo,196 Marshall assumed the Eleventh Amend-
ment would not apply to a case before the Court exercising its admiralty ju-
risdiction 197-a form of jurisdiction that seems to have been exempted from
... Id. at 407.
16 Id. at 412 (quoting the Eleventh Amendment).
187 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
188 See id. at 857-58.
189 Id. at 847 ("The eleventh amendment of the constitution has exempted a State from the suits of
citizens of other States, or aliens. .
190 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
191 See id. at 16 ("May the plaintiff sue in [this court]? Is the Cherokee nation a foreign state in the
sense in which that term is used in the constitution?").
192 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 19 (1890).
193 See McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcohol, Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990) ("The
Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases aris-
ing from state courts"). Although McKesson was a unanimous decision, before Alden, it seemed an in-
consistent position for the Justices inclined to the federal-question immunity interpretation, insofar as it
would have allowed a private party to make an end-rn around the Eleventh Amendment (as they under-
stood it) by suing an unconsenting State in state court on a federal claim and then appealing to the Su-
preme Court (rather than suing the State in a federal court in the first instance).
194 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
195 See id. at 562; see also Gibbons, supra note 12, at 1953-55 & n.353.
196 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833).
197 Id. at 632; see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
1073
96:1027 (2002)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the Amendment's coverage by its limitation to "any suit in law or equity."
However, Marshall held that the Amendment did apply to the specific facts
in Madrazzo, where in rem admiralty jurisdiction did not lie because the
property at issue was not before the court or in the custody of a private
party. 198
Diversity explanation advocates have read Madrazzo to stand for the
broader proposition that the Marshall Court believed the Eleventh Amend-
ment inapplicable to federal question and admiralty claims. 199 But the con-
flation is unwarranted, most prominently because of the literal language of
the Amendment, but also, on a more practical level, because (as Justice Ire-
dell had noted) admiralty cases involved uniquely external sovereignty is-
sues where it was important for the courts of the United States to speak in
one voice, whereas federal-question cases could involve internal sover-
eignty issues in an interstate context where due respect for the States' sov-
ereignty had to be counter-balanced. 20 0  Regardless, however, the current
doctrine is that the Eleventh Amendment bars private in personam suits
against the States in admiralty.20 1
The question whether the international law interpretation would hold
the Eleventh Amendment to apply in admiralty cases (it would, but the an-
swer is not as clear as the literal language suggests) is an interesting one-
consideration of which might clarify misperceptions about how that inter-
pretation works. The adjudication of admiralty and maritime law disputes
was clearly a national function of an external sovereignty orientation given
that "maritime commerce" was "the jugular vein of the Thirteen States," 202
and, in this sense, it would have seemed proper to have accorded the federal
courts a broad jurisdictional grant unencumbered by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. As Hamilton put it in Federalist 80:
The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a dispo-
sition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance of maritime causes. These
so generally depend on the laws of nations and so commonly affect the rights
STATES 561 (1833) ("[A] suit in the admiralty is not, correctly speaking, a suit in law, or in equity; but is
often spoken of in contradistinction to both.").
198 Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.), at 632; accord California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491,
494-95 (1998).
199 See, e.g., Gibbons, supra note 12, at 1961. ("[Cjarefiul examination of [the Madrazzo] opinions
in light of their complex legal and factual context demonstrates that the Marshall Court did not intend to
apply the eleventh amendment to actions brought under federal question or admiralty jurisdiction as op-
posed to federal-party status jurisdiction.").
200 See Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 97-98 (1795) (Iredell, J.).
201 See Exparte New York, No. 1,256 U.S. 490, 502 (1921) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
barred in personam admiralty jurisdiction in a suit brought by private parties against a New York offi-
cial).
202 "Maritime commerce was then the jugular vein of the Thirteen States. The need for a body of
law applicable throughout the nation was recognized by every shade of opinion in the Constitutional
Convention ." FELIx FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 7 (1927).
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of foreigners that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the
public peace. The most important part of them are, by the present Confedera-
tion, submitted to the federal jurisdiction.203
At the same time, interstate admiralty disputes were not uncommon,204
and it may have seemed prudent to constrain the potential for offending the
States in such cases by foreclosing private plaintiff suits against the States
in admiralty. Moreover, admiralty law has its roots in the actual substantive
law of nations,20 5 in which individuals were effectively nonentities and all
rules were trumped by the sovereignty principle.
But in the end, the international law interpretation supports the conclu-
sion that States retained no sovereign immunity over suits in admiralty
(consistent with the language of the Eleventh Amendment), but more as a
matter of practice than theory. That is to say, the vast majority of admiralty
cases in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were in rem, and an
admiralty court could only exercise its in rem jurisdiction with respect to
property actually before it or in the custody of private persons. 206 Under
these circumstances admiralty suits against States would have been rare, as
Madrazzo demonstrated, 20 7 and while Justice Iredell and the jurists of his
time who were involved in drafting the Eleventh Amendment might have
realized that such suits were possible, they probably thought them
unlikely.208 And in the few cases that might come along where the defen-
dant State had presumably voluntarily turned over the disputed property to
the custody of the admiralty court (thereby signaling a threshold willingness
to compromise), Marshall may have been correct in believing the Eleventh
Amendment should have no effect.
C. Literal Interpretation Critiques
In defending the diversity explanation, Judge Fletcher has presented
evidence to critique the previous literal interpretations offered by Professors
Massey and Marshall--criticisms that, if valid, would be equally damning
to the international law theory. First, he marshals an attack on the claim to
the proper plain meaning of the text, by arguing that the Amendment could
just as easily be read as limited just to the two diversity headings of Article
III (State-Citizen of another State; State-Foreign State, Citizen, or Subject),
rather than as "a party-based denial ofjurisdiction that sweeps across all the
203 THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
204 See Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 14, at 1078-80. Recall, for example, the
dispute between Massachusetts and New Hampshire citizens over proceeds from a prize ship at issue in
Penhallow. See Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 60-63.
205 See Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 97.
206 See Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (6 Pet.), at 632; United States v. Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232, 1236 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1809).
207 See Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (6 Pet.), at 632.
208 See Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. at 1236.
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jurisdictional heads of Article 111."2 09 To support the assertion, he points to
a constitutional amendment proposed (but never enacted) in 1805 by Sena-
tor Breckenridge of Kentucky, which stated:
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
controversies between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of
different states, between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under the
grants of different States; and between a State, or the citizens, thereof and for-
eign States, citizens, or subjects.211
Fletcher points out that the opening of Breckenridge's amendment-
"the judicial power shall not be construed to extend" is identical to the
opening phrase of the Eleventh Amendment, and convincingly argues that
Breckenridge's amendment was intended solely to eliminate the diversity
jurisdiction.211 He concludes that, since Breckenridge's amendment is "to
our ear linguistically deficient in the same way as the Eleventh Amend-
ment," however strange it might seem to us now, it may have been reason-
able to have drafted the Amendment as it was written while still intending
to repeal only the State-citizen and State-foreign diversity heads ofjurisdic-
tion.2 12
Judge Fletcher's ingenious argument ultimately fails because Brecken-
ridge's proposed amendment tracks word-for-word the last three "contro-
versies" headings in Article III and could therefore be read, as plainly now
as in 1805, as intending to wipe out those three diversity heads alone. Con-
sider the language of the Eleventh Amendment by comparison: "The Judi-
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Note again the use of "any suit in law or equity" as opposed to
"controversies" and the conscious omission of "foreign State." Further
proof of the broader party-based nature of the Eleventh Amendment pro-
scription by comparison to the Breckenridge amendment is evident in the
use of other language--"commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States"--that is not present at all in Article III. Comparing the two
amendments to Article III side by side, then, Judge Fletcher's argument
does little to undermine the conclusion that what the Eleventh Amendment
most plainly seems to say now was what it was originally meant to say, as
Justice Marshall believed.
To set the context of Judge Fletcher's other important criticism of the
literal language explanation, we need to return to what is both the greatest
insight afforded by the diversity theory and its greatest weakness. The di-
209 Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 14, at 1276-79.
210 14 ANNALS OF CONGREss 53 (Feb. 8, 1805).
211 Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 14, at 1277-78.
212 Id. at 1278-79.
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versity theory draws due attention to the fact that the Eleventh Amendment
addressed a problem that was specific to a subset of diversity suits-
interstate and international interactions between private parties and States.
By contrast, Hans had crafted a reading of the Amendment that had ren-
dered the fact of diversity irrelevant to its effect. The problem arises, how-
ever, in the case of a suit that might be brought under both diversity and
federal-question jurisdictions-the issue was not presented by the Chisholm
suit because there was no federal-question jurisdiction statute at the time,
but, as we have discussed, such a statute was certainly a clear possibility.
In such a case, under the diversity theory, whether a federal court would
have jurisdiction would turn on whether the plaintiff pled diversity or aris-
ing-under jurisdiction. A comparative advantage of both the federal-
question immunity and international law theories is that the Eleventh
Amendment would retain its full force regardless of how a private suit is
pleaded.
Indeed, the most damning argument against the diversity interpretation
is that Chisholm, or any other suit brought by citizens of other States or citi-
zens or subjects of foreign states, to enforce securities or contracts issued by
the States, could at least arguably have been brought under the Contracts
Clause, perhaps even without a statute under the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction,213 as construed by the Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Peck,214
seventeen years after Chisholm. Justice Wilson apparently thought so at the
time that Chisholm was decided; 215 Justice Iredell clearly noted and com-
prehended the import of Wilson's dictum,216 but did not challenge it. Cer-
tainly, claims against States brought by English citizens under the Treaty of
Paris in 1783 would have properly been brought under the "arising under"
jurisdiction, regardless whether Justice Marshall's interpretation of the Con-
tracts Clause in Fletcher v. Peck accorded with original intent.217 If the
Eleventh Amendment meant what the diversity explanation advocates say it
means, then it could have been easily circumvented by the passage of a
general federal-question jurisdiction statute like the short-lived Judiciary
Act of 1801218 which purported to authorize federal jurisdiction to the full
extent of the Constitution,219 and artful pleading to fall within the statute's
213 See supra note 55.
214 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
215 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) ("What good purpose could [the Con-
tracts Clause] secure, if a state might pass a law, impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be
amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controlling judiciary power?"); see also Moultrie v. Geor-
gia, in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 51, at 512 (contemplating Contracts Clause suit by pri-
vate party against Georgia shortly after Chisholm was decided); supra note 56 and accompanying text.
216 James Iredell, Notes on the Justices' Opinions (Feb. 18, 1793), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 51, at 216.
217 See WRIGHT, supra note 56, at 15-21.
218 Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat 89.
219 See Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 3
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generous compass.
Judge Fletcher responds to this charge by going on the offensive. He
notes that a literal reading of the Amendment would not prohibit the as-
signment of state contracts to in-state citizens unspecified by its language;
thus, even under a literal meaning, the force of the Amendment could be
nullified by strategic litigation.220  But Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of
1789,221 the "assignee clause," specified that federal courts lacked jurisdic-
tion in "any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other
chose in action in favour of an assignee unless a suit might have been
prosecuted in such court... if no assignment had been made. '222 Under the
terms of the statute that was then in effect, if the Eleventh Amendment pre-
cluded federal jurisdiction over any suits against a State by noncitizens,
then assignment to an in-state citizen would not have sufficed to establish
it.223 Whether or not the assignee clause would have been interpreted at the
time to bar assignments to in-state citizens designed to circumvent the
Eleventh Amendment, it seems to be a reasonable construction of that stat-
ute-one that would have convinced the Amendment's ratifiers that the po-
tential for collusive in-state assignment under the Amendment as drafted
would be minimal.224
D. Justices Iredell and Wilson and the Eleventh Amendment
Before moving on in Part IV to discuss the implications of the interna-
tional law theory on current Eleventh Amendment doctrine, it seems useful
to talk about the Chisholm opinions of Justices Iredell and Wilson and more
broadly their views on international law and state sovereignty given their
importance in the origins of the Eleventh Amendment. Since the conven-
tional view is that the Eleventh Amendment memorialized what Iredell said
and meant in his Chisholm dissent, the inquiry is valuable for evidentiary
reasons to the extent that Iredell's opinion and views are consistent with the
international law theory. As important, looking carefully at the writings of
(1965); Envin C. Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801,2 AM. I LEGAL HIST. 53 (1958).
220 Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation, supra note 14, at 1281; Marshall, supra note 8, at 1366-67
n.113.
221 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (1789). The current form of the statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1994) which pro-
vides: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or
otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
The statute and its predecessors traditionally have been used to prevent collusive efforts to establish di-
versity jurisdiction by assigning causes of action to qualifying plaintiffs. See, e.g., Kramer v. Caribbean
Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969). However, the language of the assignee clause does not limit its effect
to diversity jurisdiction; it is just that there would be little utility in assigning a claim that qualifies for
federal question jurisdiction, other than in the case of assignment to an in-state citizen under the rather
unique circumstances of the Eleventh Amendment as read literally.
222 Section 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789).
The possibility of assignment to other States raises interesting problems discussed infra Part H.
224 Cf. Marshall, supra note 8, at 1366-67 n. 113 (arguing that ratifiers considered collusive assign-
ment to in-state citizens unlikely, without reference to applicability of assignee clause).
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these deeply thoughtful members of the founding generation is valuable for
what it shows about the way they thought about federalism, state sover-
eignty, the United States, and their world.
Justices Iredell and Wilson shared a deep respect for the law of na-
tions,225 but for different reasons, which are reflected in their divergent
opinions in Chisholm. To Wilson, the law of nations was useful as a means
of reinforcing directly the republic's external standing in the community of
nations,226 and indirectly, by force of analogy, the binding nature of the re-
public's laws in the internal interstate community of the American peo-
ple. 227
The institution of the States stood as an impediment to both purposes-
as contenders to the collective polity in foreign relations and as alternative
coercive authorities in domestic affairs. It is not surprising, then, that Wil-
son took every opportunity at the federal Constitutional Convention to pro-
pose proportional representation in the legislature by popular election, 228
multi-State districting for Senate seats with direct election,229 or similar
ideas that would have rendered the State a distinction without a differ-
ence. 230 He sought thereby to marginalize what he perceived to be a way
station that had outlived its usefulness on popular sovereignty's flow up-
stream to the national government.231
But Wilson could not discount the States completely. 2 2 To do so
225 Compare Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281 (1796) (Wilson, J.) ("When the United
States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modem state of
purity and refinement'), andJames Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of a Special Session of the Circuit
Court for the District of Pennsylvania, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 417-
20 ("Does a Question arise before [the common law], which properly ought to be resolved by the Law of
Nations? By that Law she will decide the Question: For that Law, in its full Extent, is adopted by her.
The Infractions of that Law form a Part of her Code of criminal Jurisprudence.... The Law of Nations
as well as the Law of Nature is of Obligation indispensable: The Law of Nations as well as the Law of
Nature is of Origin divine.'), with James Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the
District of South Carolina, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 467 ("The Com-
mon Law of England, from which our own derived, fully recognizes the principles of the Law of Na-
tions, and applies them in all cases falling under its jurisdiction, where the nature of the subject requires
it.").
226 See Jay, supra note 17, at 839-43.
227 Cf. James Wilson, Charge to the Grand Jury of a Special Session of the Circuit Court for the
District of Pennsylvania, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 418.
The Law of Nations is the Law of Sovereigns. In free States, such as ours, the sovereign Power
resides in the People. In such, therefore, the Law of Nations is the Law of the People. I mean not
that it is a Law made by the People, or by their Authority; as, in free States, municipal Laws are
made: But I mean, that, like the Law of Nature, it is indispensably binding upon the People....
Id.
228 See 1 FARRAND, supra note 95, at 252-55, 367, 449-50.
229 See id. at 148-49, 151, 153-54, 157. Not surprisingly, Wilson's motion was defeated, ten nega-
tive votes to his one affirmative.
230 See id. at 324-25.
23 See id. at 151, 166-67.
232 See id. at 157.
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would contradict the political theory of revolution he had forcefully and
quite genuinely advocated during the War of Independence, wherein revolu-
tion was justified by virtue of the fact that the several state legislatures, not
Parliament, constituted the legitimate locus of popular sovereignty.233
Moreover, as a leading citizen of a politically and economically prominent
State, it would have been imprudent for him to deny the force and relevance
of the State altogether (unless he believed that Pennsylvania's preeminence
was such that a strong American republic meant one not only capitaled in
that State but dominated by it).
In his famous Chisholm opinion, Wilson observed that the law of na-
tions was inapplicable, essentially because Chisholm was a "national pro-
ject" case which the sovereign citizens of Georgia had authorized the
general government to adjudicate when they ratified the Constitution.234
Wilson admitted that "according to some writers, [citing Vattel,] every
State, which governs itself without any dependence on another power, is a
sovereign State."235 And he conceded that "as a judge in this cause," he
could not know "[wihether, with regard to her own citizens, this is the case
of the State of Georgia."236 But "as a citizen [of the union]" he did presume
to know "the government of that state to be republican," 237 which meant for
him a government "constructed on this principle, that the supreme power
resides in the body of the people."238 He thus concluded:
As a judge of this court, I know, and can decide, upon the knowledge, that
the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of the Union, as a
part of the "People of the United States," did not surrender the supreme or
sovereign power to that state; but, as to the purposes of the Union, retained it
to themselves. As to the purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is not a
sovereign state. If the judicial decision of this case forms one of those pur-
poses; the allegation that Georgia is a sovereign state, is unsupported by the
233 See JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the
British Parliament, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 721 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (1774);
WOOD, supra note 84, at 350-51.
234 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,453-66 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
235 Id. at 457. Wilson cites to Vattel, Book I, Chapter I, Section 4, which states in its entirety:
Every nation that governs itself, under what form so ever, without any dependence on foreign
power, is a sovereign state. Its rights are naturally the same as those of any other state. Such are
moral persons who live together in a national society under the law of nations. To give a nation a
right to make an immediate figure in this grand society, it is sufficient if it be really sovereign and
independent; that is, it must govern itself by its own authority and laws. We ought therefore to
reckon in the number of sovereigns, those states that have bound themselves to another more pow-
erful by an unequal alliance, in which, as Aristotle says, to the more powerful is given more hon-
our, and to the weaker, more assistance.
VATTEL, supra note 25, at 58.
236 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 457.
237 Id. (referring presumably to the Republican Government Clause).
238 Id.
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fact.239
Wilson's argument carefully avoids a direct challenge to Georgia's
sovereignty24 °  by proposing that adjudicating this particular case-
Chisholm's cause of action-was properly a national purpose for which her
citizens had allocated sufficient sovereignty to the general government to
decide. But he sought to accomplish that very thing by expanding the scope
of what was national.
Justice Iredell perceived the importance of the law of nations generally,
and its specific applicability by analogy to the issue of State suability in
Chisholm, in a different light. He agreed with Wilson that faithful adher-
ence to the law of nations was essential to the external legitimacy of a new-
comer to the society of nations.241 Like Wilson, too, Iredell believed that
revolution had been justified when the legislatures of the various States had
displaced Parliament as the proper trustees of the people's sovereignty.242
What distinguished Iredell from his great friend and colleague,243 how-
ever, was the enduring importance that he attached to the brief but vital role
that the States had played in their revolutionary capacity. They had been
the great enablers of independence by virtue of the legitimacy of their legis-
latures-institutions that had been entrusted with the will of the people.
239 Id.
240 In this respect, Wilson's opinion was far more deferential to state sovereignty than the impolitic
opinion of Chief Justice Jay, who reasoned functionally that there was nothing special about the institu-
tion of the state that merited a special immunity from suit. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 469, 472
(Jay, Ci.).
Will it be said, that the fifty odd thousand citizens in Delaware, being associated under a state
govemment, stand in a rank so superior to the forty odd thousand of Philadelphia, associated under
their charter, that although it may become the latter to meet an individual on an equal footing in a
court ofjustice, yet that such a procedure would not comport with the dignity of the former?
Id. at 472.
241 See, e.g., Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 160-61 (1795) (Iredell, J.).
242 See Pennhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 90-93 (1795) (Iredell, J.).
243 Contrary to the impression conveyed by their disagreement in Chisholm, Justices Iredell and
Wilson were very close friends. As Iredell admitted, their "sentiments in general agree perfectly well."
Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (May 6, 1791), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 125, at 161; see also Letter from James Iredell to Richard Bennehan (Aug. 15, 1794), reprinted
in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 480 (providing letter of introduction for "my very re-
spectable Friend Judge Wilson"). Indeed, when Wilson was forced into hiding from creditors after dis-
astrous land speculation, Iredell arranged shelter for him in his hometown of Edentown, North Carolina,
where, unfortunately, the spry Scotsman Wilson contracted malaria in the sweltering Tobacco Road
summer. See Letter from Hannah Wilson to Bird Wilson (July 28, 1798), reprinted in 3 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 281-82
(Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. At his bedside upon Wil-
son's death, Iredell faithfully arranged for his friend's burial on the estate of his father in law. See Letter
from James Iredell to Thomas Pickering (Aug. 25, 1798), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra, at 286 (informing Pickering, Secretary of State, of Wilson's death on August 21, 1798); see also
David W. Maxey, The Translation of James Wilson, 1990 1. S. Cr. HISTORY 29 (1990) (recounting re-
habilitation of Wilson's reputation to include ceremonious reburial of his remains in Philadelphia in
1906).
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They had, thereby, become "bodies politic" in their own right,244 and this
transformation had accorded them a status co-equal to sovereign nations
"possessed of all the powers of sovereignty internal and external." 245 But
rather than go their own ways and thereby fully realize their unquestionable
right to be independent nation-states, the people of the States chose to es-
tablish a "general government" that would "possess all the incidents to ex-
ternal sovereignty. '246 The strong possibility that the general government
with its unprecedented and potentially limitless powers, or that the more
powerful States-Pennsylvania, New York, Massachusetts, or Virginia (the
looming giant to the north of Iredell's beloved North Carolina)-might un-
dermine the complicated structure of this voluntary "surrender," 247 required
the erection of an unimpeachable legal baseline that recognized the special
status of the States arising from their necessary role in justifying the Revo-
lution and establishing the Constitution.
Iredell understood instinctively and maintained consistently that the
best way to protect this special status-the sovereign dignity of the States,
was to forge an absolute identity between the sovereignty of the States and
the more general, inviolable principle of sovereignty as it was understood in
the laws and political theories of nations.248 This special respect for foreign
and state sovereignty was a life project of Iredell's tenure on the Court,
threaded through his various opinions and grand jury charges, in much the
same way that the incorporation of the Bill of Rights to the States was Jus-
tice Black's.249 Thus, he resolutely resisted any encroachment on formal
244 See Pennhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 94.
[E]very particle of authority which originally resided either in congress, or in any branch of the
state governments, was derived from the people, who were permanent inhabitants of each prov-
ince, in the first instance, and afterwards became citizens of each state; that this authority was con-
veyed by each body politic separately, and not by all the people in the several provinces, or states,
jointly ....
Id.
245 Id. at 92.
246 Id. at 94.
247 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 434 (1793).
248 See id. ("Every state in the Union, in every instance where its sovereignty has not been delegated
to the United States, I consider to be as completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the
powers surrendered.... [O]f course, the part not surrendered must remain as it did before."); id. at 446
("Now, there are, in my opinion, the most essential differences between the old cases of corporations ...
and the great and extraordinary case of states separately possessing, as to everything simply relating to
themselves, the fullest powers of sovereignty.").
249 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("The Bill of Rights ...
in my view is made fully applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 20-21 (1980) (stating that in In re Winship, Justice Black,
"pursuing his 'incorporation' theory," refused to read the reasonable doubt standard into the Fourteenth
Amendment because it did not appear in the Bill of Rights); MORTON J. HORwlTz, THE WARREN
COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 91-98 (1998) (stating that Justice Black believed that the protec-
tions afforded by the Bill of Rights was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
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legal distinctions that accorded special respect for sovereign states, foreign
or domestic, and he sought to design the doctrine in a way that brooked no
distinction between the two types of sovereigns.
The most notable example of this philosophy is Iredell's resilient
stance on the exclusivity of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in
cases involving ambassadors and the States as parties. As the circuit justice
in Chisholm, Iredell held that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was
exclusive in cases where States were parties. 20 He also hewed to an ultra-
strict construction of the international law rule regarding the plenipotentiary
status of ambassadors, insisting that haling the "Public Agent" of a foreign
sovereign into a federal court other than the Supreme was an inexcusable
affront to sovereign dignity.251 He was apparently the only Justice in the
history of the Court, indeed the only federal judge with recorded opinions,
to have believed this . 2
It was natural, then, for Iredell to accept and to apply the corollary rule
of sovereign equality to the American context, denying the legitimacy of
private action in interstate and international suits against States.2 3 Given
his belief in the identity and mutually reinforcing nature of sovereignty in
its State and nation-state incarnations, the consequences of the obverse rule
would be disastrous for the republic both internally and externally. On the
international level, given the republic's foreign war debts, many to private
creditors, foregoing the rule would operate in one direction only, against the
interests of the United States. Moreover, the conviction that individual ac-
tion in interstate relation could only cause trouble was reinforced at the time
by the American public furor over "Citizen Genet," the French minister
who schemed to incite the United States to violate its neutrality and declare
war on Great Britain.254 On the domestic level, a departure from the sover-
eign equality principle to recognize noncitizen rights against States would
effect a similarly skewed benefit for the wealthier, more populous States
against the relatively poorer, sparsely populated States like North Caro-
lina-inequalities in fact to which the ideal of sovereignty was impervious.
It was in this sense that Iredell disagreed with Wilson and understood "The
Conventional Law of Nations" to apply to the Chisholm case.
255
But just as Wilson was unwilling to go so far as to deny any special
status to state sovereignty (though this may have been his intent),256 Iredell
250 See Farquhar v. Georgia (C.C.D. Ga. 1791) (redell, J.), reprinted in 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 51, at 154.
251 See United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
252 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 297.
253 See James Iredell, Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of South Cam-
lina, reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 467 ("In whatever manner the Law of
Nations is violated, it is a subject of national, and not personal complaint.").
Z4 See Lapradelle, supra note 140, at xxxvi.
255 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,449 (1793).
256 See id. at 457 (Wilson, J.).
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readily acknowledged that the sovereign dignity of the States could not save
them from suit where the alleged violation involved issues over which the
people of the various States had legitimately allocated their sovereignty to
the general government. 2 7 When a citizen of a State brought such a claim
against the State, Iredell's special interstate sovereign dignity concern was
not a factor because the plaintiff had a right to sue for violations of funda-
mental laws as a participant in both levels of sovereignty. That a citizen
had a right of recourse to the courts of his sovereign for the violation of a
fundamental law was foundational to his understanding of popular sover-
eignty; the important point of distinction was that, at the time, because of
the dogma of mutually exclusive sovereignties, it was difficult to imagine
that a suit brought by a citizen against his own State could arise under fed-
eral law.258 But when a citizen of another State brought the same claim, the
sovereign's dignity interest had to be balanced against the general govern-
ment's interest in enforcing its fundamental laws, and, it seems likely that
Iredell would have maintained that the former should trump the latter, as
was the case in the classical law of nations.
Under this interpretation, Iredell's lengthy discourse on the sovereign's
immunity from assumpsit suits259 cannot be taken to support a broad sense
of sovereign immunity. Because, on the facts in Chisholm, he had ascer-
tained that there was no claim of a violation of fundamental laws, he sensi-
bly avoided the tough constitutional question and found his answer in the
common law (under which the sovereign was immune). 260 In this sense, he
would have reached the same decision if the action had been brought by a
citizen against his own State or against the United States, in state or federal
court-in all these cases, his political theory of sovereignty would not have
required a private remedy.
But had the case been brought by an out-of-state U.S. citizen (as dis-
tinct from a foreign citizen or subject) as one "arising under the Constitu-
tion," a violation of the fundamental laws would have been pleaded, and
Iredell would have been forced to have reached the same result on the sov-
ereign dignity interest alone, if unable to persuade his colleagues that the
case did not state a constitutional claim. In that event, Iredell's focus on the
absence of controlling congressional authorization by statute in Chisholm
suggests that he might have considered the sovereign dignity interest ade-
257 See id. at 435-36 (Iredell, J.).
258 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J.) ("If any act of congress, or of the
legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit,
that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that
authority, but in a clear and urgent case.").
259 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437-46; see also John V. Orth, The Truth About Justice Ire-
dell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 73 N.C. L. REV. 267-68 (1994).
260 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449 ("[l]t is of extreme moment, that no judge should rashly
commit himself upon important questions, which it is unnecessary for him to decide.").
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quately protected by legislative federalism. 261 That is to say, he may indeed
have permitted the suit, but only if Congress had passed an enabling fed-
eral-question jurisdiction statute.
If, by contrast, a sovereign state, whether one of the United States, the
United States, or a foreign state, had brought the suit against Georgia, either
as a common-law or a federal-law claim, Iredell's formulation of the is-
sues-consistent with the international law theory-would have led him to
have decided that jurisdiction was proper, absent a collusive assignment to
the plaintiff State in violation of the assignee clause. As under the law of
nations, the crucial factor in determining whether jurisdiction in a supreme
supra-state tribunal was proper in a suit against a state would be whether or
not the plaintiff party was itself a co-equal state.
If the controversy had in fact occurred among nation-states, the tradi-
tional law of nations would have recognized the legality of the offended
state's resort to war as the ultimate option should all else fail. 262 In the
American interstate context, this option was specifically foreclosed by Arti-
cle I's restrictions on the States' warmaking powers,263 but this did not
mean that a frustrated State might not decide to take matters in its own
hands if denied fair adjudication of the issue in contest. Such a war would
have doomed the union, as Iredell, the dedicated Federalist,264 well under-
stood. Accordingly, he sought first to validate the powers of the general
government in its external functions, 265 thereby faithfully executing the
Court's "national" functions of enforcing the consensus that the Constitu-
tion had embodied as to external affairs, and reinforcing political, social,
and economic bonds among the States in the process. At the same time,
unlike Wilson, he was ever mindful of the Court's vital "international"
function as a safety valve to deal with those few interstate disputes that
could not be resolved by political or other means.
This interpretation of Justice Iredell's Chisholm opinion and his under-
standing of state sovereignty reconciles three inconsistencies that alternative
explanations have failed to address. First, although some have character-
261 See id. at 432 ("This appears to me to be one of those cases, with many others, in which an arti-
cle of the constitution cannot be effectuated, without the intervention of the legislative authority."). But
see id. at 449 ("[Mly present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the Constitution], which
will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a state for the recovery of money.").
262 See VArrEL, supra note 25, at 355 (Bk. II, Ch. XVIII, § 354) ("But if from particular conjec-
tures, and from the obstinacy of an unjust adversary, neither reprisals nor any of the methods of which
we have been treating, are sufficient for our defence, and for the protection of our rights, there remains
the unhappy and sad resource of war....").
263 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... engage
in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.").
264 See Orth, supra note 259, at 266 ("[Iredell's] reputation has suffered from the need to incorpo-
rate a supposedly restrictive reading of the Constitution in Chisholm into a life story otherwise plainly
Federalist.').
265 See Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 95 (1795).
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ized Iredell as a States' rights activist,266 he was a steady Federalist: a force
behind North Carolina's ratification of the Constitution,267 loyal to the Fed-
eralist administrations of Washington and Adams, and a proponent of na-
tionalist sentiments in the corpus of his opinions and correspondence. 268
Second, the perception that Iredell favored the absolute immunity of the
States from private suits is inconsistent with his support for judicial re-
view269 and his resolute belief in popular sovereignty.270 Third, as the di-
versity advocates have pointed out,271 the narrow ground of Iredell's actual
holding on the "particular question ... [of whether] an action of assumpsit
lie against a state" 272 is inconsistent with broad statements about the consti-
tutional nature of any immunity that he recognized on the facts in Chisholm.
If, as the Hans Court and many others have argued, the Eleventh Amend-
ment did indeed memorialize Iredell's dissent,273 then the congruence be-
tween its rationale and his general beliefs, and the principles and rules of
the law of nations, supports the international law interpretation of the
Amendment.
IV. DOCTRINAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
EXPLANATION APPLIED
The question to be answered in this Part is the practical one of what
should be done about the current law of state sovereign immunity in light of
the international law explanation. It seems prudent at the start to distin-
guish those prescriptions of the theory, most importantly, the notions that
consent would be insufficient to waive immunity and that the States should
not enjoy immunity as to in personam admiralty suits, which are either so
contrary to existing doctrine or of such minor importance that further dis-
cussion seems unwarranted. The present discussion, rather, focuses on
three aspects in which the implications of the international law theory ap-
pear to diverge from the state of the law that seem both important to the
266 See, e.g., 1 GRIFFITH J. McREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 381-82 (Peter
Smith New York 1941) (1857).
267 See Orth, supra note 259, at 267; Willis P. Whichard, James Iredell, in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME
COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 198, 206-10 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998).
268 See Whichard, supra note 267, at 210-11.
269 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.) ("If any act of Congress, or of
the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I
admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort
to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case."); Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 412 (1792)
(representation to President of the United States of Iredell, Circuit Justice) ("[N]o decision of any court
of the United States can, under any circumstances, in our opinion, agreeable to the constitution, be liable
to a revisions, or even suspension, by the legislature itself.. ').
270 See Penhallow v. Doane's Adm'rs, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 93-94 (1795).
271 See, e.g., Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation, supra note 14.
272 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,430 (1793).
273 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1890).
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core principles of the theory and useful in understanding it. These relate to
the doctrine of congressional abrogation by legislation to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, the related doctrines of espousal of private claims by
sovereign states and suits brought by foreign states, and the doctrines of
state sovereign immunity in the courts of the State and other States.
A. The International Law Explanation and Congressional Abrogation
While the doctrine of congressional abrogation, briefly discussed in
subpart II.B, appears on its face to be in tension with the international law
explanation, the inconsistency disappears upon closer scrutiny, by virtue of
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is because the norma-
tive component of the international law theory contemplates suits by a
State's own citizens for violations of "fundamental laws"--an issue on
which the language of the Eleventh Amendment, given its "international"
orientation, is understandably silent. The power of state citizens to sue their
States for fundamental violations was extended to all citizens of the United
States by Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 1 states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to anyperson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws 74
Section 5 declares that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."2 75 The language of
Section 1 effectively cleaves the Eleventh Amendment's implicit equiva-
lence between U.S. citizens who are "Citizens of another State" and "Citi-
zens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Among the "privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States" which the States may not
abridge, is the right to sue States for violations of fundamental laws of the
United States.
In this sense, the Fourteenth Amendment, enacted in the wake of the
secession of the Southern States and the Civil War, represents, as the fed-
eral-question immunity advocates also acknowledge, a recalibration of the
relative balancing of national and international project goals vis-A-vis the
branches of the federal government, including the judiciary.276 As citizens
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
275 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
276 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) ("By imposing explicit limits on the powers of
the States and granting Congress the power to enforce them, the Amendment 'fundamentally altered the
balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution' (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 59 (1996))); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). It does not necessarily follow,
however, that any congressional legislation passed pursuant to constitutional provisions predating the
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of the United States, those with a claim to national sovereignty were
thereby granted standing equivalent to those of citizens of the States to sue
a State not their own for violations of fundamental national laws. Current
doctrine defines these violations by reference to legislation to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, which makes sense, but the international law the-
ory would add to the list all federal constitutional violations. Stated differ-
ently, the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporates" the right to sue a
sovereign State for transgressions of fundamental law to all U.S. citizens in
a manner not unlike the way in which Justice Black argued that it "incorpo-
rated" the Bill of Rights to the States.
By contrast, the Amendment explicitly does not extend this privilege to
those who are not "citizens of the United States." Whether the subset of
noncitizens-those "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State," who never-
theless fall within the definition of "any person" set forth in the Due Proc-
ess or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as, for
example, permanent resident aliens under certain circumstances-are enti-
tled to a similar right to sue States for fundamental violations is a tough
question that is better left for another day. What is clear, however, is that
the Eleventh Amendment retains full effect vis-h-vis "Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State" who do not count as "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B. Suits Against the States by Foreign States and the Doctrine of Espousal
A second, more enduring way in which doctrine shaped according to
the international law interpretation would diverge from the current law of
state sovereign immunity concerns the extension of the Eleventh Amend-
ment bar to suits against States brought by foreign states, an extension that
ignores the clear import of the Amendment's text, which was confirmed by
early decisions of the Supreme Court. For example, the Marshall Court
stated in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia277 that a foreign state's ability to sue a
State was unaffected by the Amendment.278  But although the Supreme
Court has upheld State suability with respect to other States279 and the
Civil War may not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the States, as the doctrine presumes. Certainly,
as this Article has already noted, see supra subpart I.13, a convincing argument could be made that a
fundamental reordering of the federal government's authority as to the States should result in greater
power under prior constitutional provisions as well. But that argument has been better made by others
and is beyond the scope of this Article.
277 30U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
278 See id. at 15-16.
279 See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 182 n.9 (1982) ("Because the State of Colo-
rado has a substantial interest in the outcome of this suit, New Mexico may not invoke its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from federal actions by citizens of another State"); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) ("[Ain original action between two States only violates the Eleventh
Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover for injuries to specific individuals."); Kan-
sas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907) ("[The Eleventh Amendment] refers only to suits and actions by
individuals, leaving undisturbed the jurisdiction over suits or actions by one State against another.").
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United States, 280 it expressly concluded in 1934, in the case of Principality
ofMonaco v. Mississippi28' that the "same fundamental principle" that sanc-
tioned extension of the Amendment's bar to suits by a State's own citizens
in Hans supported state immunity from suits brought by foreign nations.282
The unanimous decision in Monaco was additionally justified by the policy
concern of interference in the federal government's conduct of foreign rela-
tions.283
The Monaco Court's decision was not only more clearly inconsistent
with the Eleventh Amendment's text (the Amendment says "Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State where Article Ill had clearly enumerated
"foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects") and early Supreme Court precedent
than Hans, it also neglected the compelling sovereignty-related reasons for
the Amendment's design. It did so, first, by undermining the Eleventh
Amendment's implicit and powerful statement about the equal status and
dignity of the sovereignty of the States as compared to that of nation-
states-the equivalence that Iredell perceived as central to unity within the
republic.28 4  Second, it created a new and potentially dangerous "right-
remedy" gap with respect to the capacity for individual aliens to obtain re-
lief for wrongs committed by the States. The Eleventh Amendment pro-
scribed direct suits by foreign citizens or subjects--often from powerful
creditor nations like Britain and France--on the assumption that aggrieved
foreigners could appeal to their states for political, economic, and diplo-
matic intercession, which the sovereign state by undertake on behalf of its
citizens if warranted by national interests.285 Indeed, the absence of a forum
280 See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) ("[N]othing in... the Constitu-
tion prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to prevent a State's being sued by the United States.");
United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642 (1892) ("[The Supreme Court] has original jurisdiction of a
suit by the United States against a State.").
281 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (unanimous opinion).
282 Id. at 329-30. Professor Monaghan has argued that the Seminole Tribe Court should have con-
sidered the possibility that Congress could abrogate Florida's Eleventh Amendment immunity with re-
spect to Indian tribes, whose sovereign status logically seems to be somewhere between that of states
who can sue other states, and foreign states, who cannot under Monaco. See Henry Paul Monaghan, The
Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 116-17 (1996). This is an intriguing argu-
ment, but it seems to contradict the significance, if not the letter, of the holding in Cherokee Nation,
which expressly denied that tribes were "foreign states" for jurisdictional purposes, but also implicitly
assumed that they did not qualify as States for federal jurisdiction purposes. See Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16-20 (1831).
283 See id. at 331-32.
284 See supra Part ElI.
285 See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 259 (1796) (Iredell, J.).
When any individual, therefore, of any nation, has causes of complaint against another nation,
or any individual of it, not immediately amenable to the authority of his own, he may complain to
that power in his own nation, which is entrusted with the sovereignty of it, as to foreign negotia-
tions, and he will be entitled to all the redress which the nature of his case requires, and the situa-
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for mediation might prove disastrous for interstate peace, as the traditional
law of nations recognized the right of nations to go to war to vindicate just
claims.2 86
The logic of espousal becomes complicated in the context of the do-
mestic United States, however, because of the presence of the federal gov-
ernment and multiple state governments, each of which could potentially be
sued by States or by foreign nations on behalf of their respective citizens.
In the domestic interstate context, permitting noncollusive espousal in the
federal courts acting as mediators would seem to benefit national harmony
and to present a welcome alternative to the constitutionally prohibited sanc-
tion of State-initiated war,287 in order to afford redress to out-of-state U.S.
citizens who have been seriously injured by other States. One could even
argue that it is the responsibility of the sovereign agents in a republican
state to prosecute such claims to the best of their ability. But the law does
not recognize such a right of States to interstate espousal.288 The prohibi-
tion is inconsistent with the Eleventh Amendment's design, but, in practice,
mitigated by the Fourteenth Amendment's grant of co-equal privileges or
immunities to all citizens of the United States, which permits the out-of-
state U.S. citizen to sue a State directly for violations of statutory laws en-
acted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under the current doctrine, and
for constitutional violations under the international law theory.
With respect to State-foreign state lawsuits, the Monaco Court pre-
sumed that a net benefit to the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs would
accrue from an exclusive allocation of associated responsibilities to the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches of the national government. This instinct,
though perhaps reasonable, is not only inconsistent with the design and text
of the Eleventh Amendment, it may also result in impediments to the con-
duct of foreign affairs in situations where the national executive and legisla-
ture are powerless for political reasons to bend the States to policies that
would nevertheless be in the national interest. The federal courts, in their
mediating international governance capacity, could prove to be a useful
institution in such circumstances.
This particular problem loomed large to the leaders of the young repub-
Miserable and disgraceful, indeed, would be the situation of the citizens of the United States, if
they were obliged to comply with a treaty on their part, and had no means of redress for a non-
compliance by the other contracting power.
But they have, and the law of nations points out the remedy. The remedy depends on the dis-
cretion and sense of duty of their own government.
Id. at 260.
286 See VATTEL, supra note 25, at 348-49 (Bk. H, Ch. XVIII, §§ 338-40).
287 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... engage in
War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit delay.").
288 See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 745 n.21 (1981) ("[A]n original action between
two States only violates the Eleventh Amendment if the plaintiff State is actually suing to recover inju-
ries to specific individuals." (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59 n.12 (1972))).
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lic, supervising a brood of powerful and unruly States that had independ-
ently and collectively incurred significant contractual and treaty obligations
to foreign nations. Effective conduct of relations with foreign powers-at
the very least, the deterrence of war--counseled the provision of credible
rights to remediation for treaty violations in the federal courts. Conven-
iently, the recent case of Breard v. Greene289 reminds us that this dilemma
persists today.
In Breard, a Paraguayan national was arrested, convicted, and sen-
tenced to death by a Virginia court for attempted rape and murder.290 Dur-
ing his detention, he was not informed about his right to notify Paraguayan
consular officials under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations;291 nor did state officials inform the Paraguayan consulate as re-
quired by a U.S.-Paraguay bilateral treaty.292 A federal district court re-
jected Paraguay's subsequent diversity suit seeking vindication of these
claims, finding, inter alia, that "the Eleventh Amendment bars suits by a
foreign government against a state government in federal court."293 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed294 and Virginia scheduled Breard's execution for
April 14, 1998.
On April 3, Paraguay began proceedings against the United States in
the International Court of Justice, which promptly issued a provisional or-
der instructing the United States to "take all measures at its disposal to en-
sure that Angel Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision
in these proceedings. '295 The Supreme Court denied certiorari, citing, inter
289 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam).
290 See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va. 1996).
291 Article 36, entitled "Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State," provides:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the send-
ing State:
(a) consular officials shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to
have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to
communications with and access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, in-
form the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody, or
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal rep-
resentation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of ajudgment. Nevertheless, consular of-
ficers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention
if he expressly opposed such action.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 78, 100-01.
292 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 4, 1859, U.S.-Para., 12 Stat. 1091.
293 Allen, 949 F. Supp. at 1272.
294 See Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 1998).
295 Application of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.) Provisional Meas-
ures, par. 37 (Order of Apr. 9, 1998) (unanimous ruling) (on file with author).
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alia, the Eleventh Amendment bar articulated in Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi.296 Nonetheless, the State Department asked the Virginia gov-
ernor to postpone Breard's execution fearing that the perception that the
United States took its Vienna Convention obligations lightly might inspire
retaliations against Americans abroad.297 The plea fell on deaf ears, how-
ever, and Breard was executed by lethal injection on April 14, 1998 as
scheduled. 298
Presuming that Paraguay alleged a cause of action under the bilateral
treaty (which was another issue), affording Paraguay a forum in the federal
courts given Virginia's intransigence vis-A-vis the executive branch would
have benefited the United States's conduct of its foreign affairs in light of
the State Department's position. The case vividly elucidates the structural
deficiency of a political system in which a general government must man-
age States with policies and goals that might conflict with national priori-
ties. As the Framers realized, the courts could productively supplement the
national executive and the legislature in the pursuit of national interests in
such circumstances. Although the nature of these institutions-the States,
the federal executive, Congress, the federal judiciary, and even the content
and scope of fundamental rights-has evolved, the structural strengths and
infirmities of the system have persisted. By foreclosing the option of for-
eign states turning to the federal courts, the Supreme Court may not only
have misconstrued the Eleventh Amendment, it may also have unwisely up-
set the capacity of the system to face external and internal sovereignty prob-
lems that have similarly endured.
C. State Sovereign Immunity in State Courts
A final category of differences worth mentioning between the interna-
tional law explanation and the doctrine concerns state sovereign immunity
in state courts. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not expressly ad-
dress the suability of the States in state courts, one can infer from the sover-
eignty principle underlying the international law interpretation that States
should not be subject to private suits in the courts of other States, contrary
to the holding in Nevada v. Hall.299 Immunity against private suits in the
courts of other States is thus one respect in which the international law the-
ory would call for a broader scope of state sovereign immunity than the
doctrine presently permits.
296 292 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1934); see Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,379-81 (1998) (Justices Ste-
vens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissenting from denial of certiorari).
297 See William J. Aceves, International Decision: Application of the Vienna Convention on Consu-
lar Relations (Paraguay v. United States), 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 517, 522 & n.31 (1998).
298 See id. at 522.
299 440 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1979); see also John M. Rogers, Applying the International Law of Sov-
ereign Immunity to the States ofthe Union, 1981 DUKE L.J. 449, 476 (arguing that international law
principles should be applied to state sovereign immunity in the courts of other of the United States).
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As for private suits against States in their own courts, the same sover-
eignty principle would permit private suits for the redress of fundamental
laws or statutes enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is consistent with the actual holding in Alden v. Maine,"' where indi-
viduals claimed that Maine had violated the overtime provision of the Fair
Labor Standards Act,30 1 which was enacted under Congress's Article I
commerce powers. 30 2
Of course, Alden also stands for the larger proposition that "the States'
immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the
States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution." 3 3 This statement
is certainly consistent with the international law theory of the Eleventh
Amendment, but Alden misconstrues the nature of this foundational immu-
nity. The State was entitled to dignity in its treatment by the federal courts
because, as a republican state, it represented the collective will of its many
citizens and was therefore entitled to immunity when faced in those courts
with the money claims of an individual who had no claim to that sover-
eignty. At the same time, it was necessary to balance this dignity against
the interests of union because the State was itself embedded in a system of
federated republican states, which was in turn situated in a world of com-
petitive nation-states that further complicated the treatment of state sover-
eignty within the twice nested system.
It is no surprise, then, that suits against the States by private parties for
money damages did arise in sufficient numbers to suggest that there was no
consensus as to whether such suits were permitted by the Constitution, or
more generally, whether such suits were consistent with the political system
that the founding generation sought to construct.304 It is significant in this
respect that two powerful mid-Atlantic States-New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania-refused to ratify the Eleventh Amendment. 30 5 And given this uncer-
tainty about the suability of States, it seems imprudent to believe there was
any sense that the States' immunity from any and all private suits for money
damages, particularly suits brought by state citizens who had a claim to the
public fisc, was a fundamental aspect of sovereignty. In the law of nations
as understood by Vattel, Kant, and Iredell, absolute sovereign immunity
from private suit did constitute a fundamental aspect of sovereignty, but
only in the limited category of interstate suits. By contrast, immunity from
citizen claims of fundamental law violations was no part of sovereignty in
300 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
301 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 &
Supp. I)).
302 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999).
303 Id. at 713.
3D4 See Introduction to 5 DOcumENTARY HISTORY, supra note 51, at 1-5 (noting that there were
eight private suits against States in addition to Chisholm that were litigated to some degree in the 1790s).
305 See id. at 603 & n.31; JACOBS, supra note 1, at 181.
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republican states, the form of government that the Guarantee Clause aimed
to secure for the citizens of the States for all time, where sovereignty itself
resided in the citizenry.
V. CONCLUSION
Imagine that a British citizen, without consulting her government or
seeking its state-to-state diplomatic and political intercession, brings suit in
a putative lower court (with a Canadian judge) of the International Court of
Justice against the United States. Her complaint alleges that the U.S. gov-
ernment's failure to pay just compensation for the seizure of her house in
the Hamptons for use as a former presidents' rest home constituted a viola-
tion of international law and the Fifth Amendment. For the purposes of the
hypothetical, assume that the International Court's statute is ambiguous as
to the permissibility of aliens suing sovereign states, that the people of the
United States had unanimously agreed to the Court's general jurisdiction on
terms identical to Article III as a condition to membership in a "world gen-
eral government" to fight the Martians, and that the claim alleged a color-
able violation of both international and American constitutional law.
The diversity explanation would hold jurisdiction improper only as to
the domestic constitutional law claim. The federal-question immunity the-
ory would find jurisdiction repugnant as to both claims, indeed any claims
against the United States, notwithstanding the United States' ratification of
the general government's constitution. Justice Iredell would argue that the
defects of significance would be that one self-interested alien had brought
the claim against a country of many, and that the United States would be
subjected to the indignity of having the case tried initially by one subordi-
nate member of the international judiciary organ. Which of these conclu-
sions would most accurately reflect the reasons why such jurisdiction would
be distasteful to all Americans?
Though fanciful, the hypothetical has heuristic force in illuminating the
particular constitutional issues the Eleventh Amendment was intended to
address. The Amendment addressed not only a technical legal question,
but, as both Wilson and Iredell noted, a more important political philoso-
phical question with respect to the nature of sovereignty that was funda-
mental to the American union of states. Viewed in these terms, the federal-
question immunity theory goes too far, the diversity theory, not far enough.
This Article has presented an alternative construction, one based on the law
of nations as then understood, that strikes an intermediate balance between
the national project of maintaining a viable general government and the in-
ternational project of preserving independent state identities. The interna-
tional law interpretation has the additional advantage of explaining, rather
than explaining away, a perceived anomaly in the language of the Eleventh
Amendment. For Iredell, the Eleventh Amendment's basic prescription,
that the judicial power of the general government "shall not be construed to
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extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against [a
State] by Citizens of another State" 306 would not have seemed anomalous at
all, but rather a concise and accurate statement of the cardinal rule of the
law of nations, which he purposefully sought to import to the situation of
the States, obligatory by the nature of sovereignty, but mitigated by the
promise of republicanism to the States.
To understand the Constitution's design and intent, it is important to
realize that it speaks at times to the States as states and at others as nations.
When it contemplates the States as nations in a federated system, it seems
only logical that the Founders consulted the law of nations to answer ques-
tions of constitutional design. The intuition seems unexceptionable as ap-
plied to the distinction between treaties and compacts or to the adjudication
of boundary disputes. This Article has argued that the Eleventh Amend-
ment-the authoritative constitutional statement on the sovereignty of the
States in a federated system of states-was similarly based upon the law of
nations in which the sovereignty of nation-states was positively and norma-
tively supreme and inalienable. To Justice Iredell and the others of his gen-
eration who cherished the States' sovereignty but accepted and indeed
embraced the necessity of union, there could be no better guarantee of its
permanence than to bind it closely to the law of nations.
For Iredell, then, respecting the sovereign dignity of the States meant
according them the same treatment due to foreign nations in the Supreme
Court, and in the Supreme Court alone, acting in its international capacity
of adjudicating awesome disputes to which the States were party. This in-
cluded the right to be sued by their peers-other States and foreign states-
and by these peers alone, even when a violation of the laws of the general
government to which the States were bound was alleged. Deference was
due not because the State was a Leviathan that granted its wretched citizens
remedies as a matter of grace; Iredell believed that the Constitution's prom-
ise of republican government obligated the States to grant their sovereign
citizens remedies when they had violated the fundamental laws of the
United States they had pledged to uphold. Rather, as the law of nations
recognized, it was because sovereignty itself was the most fundamental law,
the sine qua non of the system. To acknowledge that a man or a woman
who had no claim to that sovereignty could seek relief in the general courts,
even for the most egregious violation of the law of nations or the law of the
United States (as appropriate), would contradict that most fundamental law
and cast the fate of the system into jeopardy.
The Fourteenth Amendment's ambitious decree, that the citizens of the
several States are equally "citizens of the United States" entitled to the same
"privileges or immunities" under the laws of the several States, abolished
the effect of the Eleventh Amendment with respect to out-of-state U.S. citi-
zens. The power to sue any of the States for violations of the Amendment's
306 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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guarantees was thereby vested in all citizens of the United States; the
Amendment's vitality with respect to non-U.S. aliens was unchanged, how-
ever. The international law interpretation is thus congruent with the current
Supreme Court's doctrine of congressional abrogation by exercise of its
Section 5 powers. Moreover, if, as argued, a State's own citizens had the
right to sue the State for violations of fundamental law, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could be construed as
empowering out-of-state U.S. citizens to sue the States for the same.
So, in the end, notwithstanding the sharply divergent explanations of
what the Eleventh Amendment means, the international law interpretation
would urge departure from the current doctrine in only two significant re-
spects. First, citizens of the United States should be allowed to sue the
States in the federal courts for constitutional violations as well as for viola-
tions of statutes enacted under Section 5. Second, foreign states and other
States that noncollusively espouse the claims of private citizens should be
allowed to sue the States in federal court. As a related corollary, the States
should not be entitled to sovereign immunity in state courts with respect to
federal constitutional claims or claims arising from statutes validly enacted
under Congress's Section 5 powers, but they should be entitled to state sov-
ereign immunity in the courts of other States to the same extent as in the
federal courts.
Although this Article argues that the Eleventh Amendment should be
interpreted as it most plainly reads, I do not think the text should always
trump in constitutional interpretation. For one, there should be historical
evidence to support the literal meaning-the literal interpretation must be
consistent with how people thought about the text at and around the time of
enactment. Additionally, when, as here, there is an acknowledged diver-
gence between literal meaning and the state of the doctrine, it seems fair to
say that a literal interpretation offering prescriptions for doctrinal change
ought to make policy sense, both when viewed at the time of enactment and
today. Finally, there is the test of principle on which the previous literal
theories of the Eleventh Amendment foundered--does the textual interpre-
tation accord with our sense of what is important enough to have warranted
constitutional change?
Additionally, it is not clear that all constitutional text should be equally
privileged qua text. It is one thing to say that each of the forty-three words
in the Eleventh Amendment, enacted by itself after much debate over five
years in every state legislature and in public opinion, was carefully chosen.
It is quite another to say that we should assign the same significance to con-
stitutional text that was adopted more hastily and en masse, for instance, the
Bill of Rights, or parts of the original Constitution.
Severing the tether to text seems particularly dangerous when the legal
concept that is unchained is something as potentially limitless as sovereign
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dignity in the sense the Alden majority has conjured it.307 To be sure, the
international law theory similarly explains the Eleventh Amendment as re-
flecting the larger principle of sovereign dignity, but it is a dignity that is
based on the private citizens who constitute the State, not a dignity that is
separate from and superior to its citizens. If, despite the words of the
Amendment, it offends Alden dignity as much to sue the State in state court
as in federal court,308 then how much more the affront to dignity to allow
citizens to sue States in administrative tribunals? And, under that same
boundless principle of dignity, what should it matter that a citizen's claim
against the State is a constitutional one, say a taking, rather than a statutory
one? Indeed, how long can the theory of congressional abrogation survive
in tension with this principle of dignity; or any of the current exceptions to
sovereign immunity doctrine? And how could it possibly be consistent with
dignity to allow private suits against States before subordinate magistrates
or district judges; should not these suits be brought before the Supreme
Court, as Justice Iredell believed?309 The parade of horribles is probably
overstated, but, certainly, some limitation on scope is an additional virtue of
the text-based international law explanation of the Eleventh Amendment
and its implicated dignity interest.
By these standards-text, history, policy, principle, and context-the
international law explanation is more convincing than the existing theories;
but getting it "right" is neither the only nor the most important goal-
indeed, the law of nations itself has evolved with respect to the rights of
individuals to sue sovereign states. More important is to recognize that the
Founders were thoughtful, innovative people with many intellectual debts
and sophisticated world-views. They were not dry, legal formalists en-
slaved by arcane common-law doctrines; they were blooded revolutionaries
and political philosophers of the first rank who had cherished ideals that
they sought to implement in a project-the uniqueness and importance of
which they were constantly aware. The problem of sovereignty, especially,
was one they had struggled with repeatedly-first in the War of Independ-
ence, then in the design of the constitutional system, and subsequently in
the crucial formative years of that system's existence. Their resourceful-
ness and open-mindedness should inspire us similarly to be judicious about
the lessons of the past, to be more respectful and receptive to the laws and
examples of the community of nations,310 and to be cautious about letting
307 Alden, 527 U.S. at 749.
301 Id. at 733, 749.
309 "It may also fairly be presumed that the several States thought it important to stipulate that so
awful and important a Trial [to which a State is party] should not be cognizable by any Court but the
Supreme." Farquhar v. Georgia (C.C.D. Ga. 1791) (Iredell, J.), reprinted in 5 DOCUmENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 51, at 154.
310 Cf Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
C'"Villingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that
from its birth has given a 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind.").
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our devotion to laws consume our political ideals.
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